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Abstract
Women remain underrepresented in the upper echelons of organizational
management, which is known as organizational gender stratification (OGS).
Individual processes, such as differential career choices between men and women,
contribute to OGS, along with organizational processes, such as bias in
performance appraisal evaluations. Furthermore, these factors hold implications
for organizational workforce potential if promotion decisions depend on biased
performance evaluations. The literature lacks an integration of these factors in
examining their combinatorial dynamic effects, as well as an assessment of
practical steps organizations can take to combat the cultivation of OGS. This
study has two primary purposes. First, it examines how a set of five factors unfold
over time and interactively lead to the emergence of key organizational outcomes
such as OGS and organizational workforce potential. Second, it assesses the
effectiveness of proposed human resource (HR) initiatives designed to reduce
OGS and improve organizational workforce potential. To accomplish these goals,
this study developed a computational model to conduct two virtual experiments
on the set of factors responsible for OGS. The first virtual experiment focuses on
examining the effects of the factors responsible for OGS, both individually and in
combination. The second virtual experiment focuses on exploring how proposed
HR initiatives may reduce OGS and ultimately improve organizational workforce
potential. Results show that under three levels of bias (i.e., no bias, low bias, and
high bias), differential patterns of OGS emerge based on the produced
discrepancies between perceived performance and true performance of men and
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women. In other words, organizations are not promoting their top talent due to
held perceptions, which impacts workforce potential. These effects occur more
rapidly and severely under high bias. Three bundles of HR initiatives (i.e.,
combating bias, removing familial effects, and evening the playing fields) also
differentially impact OGS. Combating bias (i.e., removing bias in performance
appraisal evaluations and selection) most strongly reduces OGS as a result of
equalizing perceived and true performance evaluations. Improving parental leave,
providing equal opportunities, and evening the playing field (i.e., having more
women in line positions) were not as effective in reducing OGS. The implications
of this study are twofold: 1) for researchers, focusing on underlying top-down and
bottom-up processes provides a more nuanced understanding of psychological
phenomena, such as OGS; 2) for practitioners, solving OGS involves assessing
multiple factors, and has implications for workforce potential; the present study
suggests focusing on reducing bias in performance appraisal and selection to
combat OGS.
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Human Resource Initiatives Addressing Factors Impacting Organizational
Gender Stratification and Performance: A Computational Study
Organizations with underrepresentation of women in upper management
positions persistently face organizational gender stratification (OGS), or the
differences in the employment pattern of men and women in organizations (Perry,
Davis-Blake, & Kulik, 1994). In 2018, women only held 22% of C-suite positions
across U.S. companies (Women in the Workplace, 2018). Subtle disadvantages
for women, such as fewer chances to meaningfully participate in meetings and
differences in the amount of developmental opportunities for men and women,
create an uneven playing field for women pursuing upper level managerial
positions. Research attributes numerous factors to this leadership gap, such as
career decisions individuals make (Wellington, Kropf, & Gerkovich, 2003),
which lead to the subtle, yet cascading phenomenon of OGS. OGS not only has
implications for those directly impacted (i.e., women), but also for organizations
indirectly. Research finds gender-diverse organizations are more likely to bring in
top talent, appeal to customers (Hunt, Layton, & Prince, 2015), and have
increased positive financial returns (Hoobler, Masterson, Nkomo, & Michel,
2016; Hunt et al., 2015). This implies that management of human capital
resources impacts organizational performance (Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011), thus
organizations should be aware of the links between OGS and organizational
workforce potential.
The “glass ceiling,” or the discrete barrier women and minorities face in
the workplace that inhibits career progression (Crampton & Mishra, 1999), is a

4

phenomenon often used to describe OGS. Individual processes, such as
differential career decisions of women and career delays (Wellington, Kropf, &
Gerkovich, 2003; Women in the Workplace, 2016), remain a partial explanation
for the glass ceiling effect. However, a large contributor to OGS comes from
organizational processes. Differences in feedback and developmental
opportunities received by women (Women in the Workplace, 2016), as well as
bias against women in promotion (Lyness & Heilman, 2006), selection (Peterson
& Saporta, 2004; Robison-Cox, Martell, & Emrich, 2007; Fernandez-Mateo &
King, 2011; Dreher, Lee, & Clerkin, 2011; Azmat & Pertongolo, 2014; Women in
the Workplace, 2016), and performance appraisal (Eagly, Makhijani, & Kloshy,
1992; Cohen, Broschak, & Haveman, 1998), additionally contribute to OGS. To
combat OGS, researchers and practitioners encourage organizations to adopt
human resources (HR) initiatives, such as expanding family and medical leave
policies offered by companies such as FaceBook, Netflix, and Starbucks
(McGregor, 2017), or training employees on how to avoid bias when evaluating
performance (Anderson, Ahman, King, Lindsey, Feyre, Ragone, & Kim, 2015).
While previous research examined factors contributing to OGS in
isolation, an integration of how these factors play out dynamically is needed.
Moreover, researchers often attempt to study higher-level phenomena by
combining individual level factors (e.g., gender bias) to explain organizational
outcomes (e.g., OGS). OGS in organizations manifests as an emergent
phenomenon where the consequences of behavior at the micro-level lead to a
macro-level effect (Martell, Emrich, & Robison-Cox, 2012). OGS warrants a
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multi-level approach to avoid misspecification of organizational-level phenomena
by allowing for an examination of dynamically interacting factors that
simultaneously produce OGS. Previous research offers insight to how
organizations might combat OGS, yet, rarely assess the effectiveness of action
taken by organizations in reducing OGS.
The proposed study aims to examine how OGS unfolds dynamically in
organizations and what organizations can do to reduce OGS through HR
initiatives. The proposed study bridges the gap between the study of OGS as a
construct versus an emergent phenomenon by incorporating processes occurring
at various levels (e.g., individual and organizational) that influence OGS in
organizations, as well as the implications it holds for organizational workforce
potential. This research uses computational modeling, which allows for an
examination of how numerous factors interact over time to produce emergent
phenomena and provide the opportunity to comparatively evaluate interventions
to influence emerged outcomes (Harrison, Lin, Carroll, & Carley, 2007). The
present study investigates how the adoption of various HR initiatives helps to
reduce OGS and impacts organizational workforce potential.
Theoretical and Research Foundation for Studying Organizational Gender
Stratification
Organizational gender stratification (OGS), or organizational segregation
based on gender (Martell et al., 2012), is an emergent organizational phenomenon
resulting from the dynamic interaction of individual and organizational processes
(Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Research on these processes provides evidence for
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their effects on inequity in the workplace and a foundation for exploring their
dynamic, interactive effects. The current study builds on this foundation and
assesses the potential effectiveness of HR initiatives to reduce OGS while
simultaneously impacting organizational workforce potential. To build a model of
dynamically, interacting factors contributing to OGS, I outline each factor in
detail to justify its importance to understanding OGS. I then propose HR
initiatives to address each of the contributing factors and bundle them according
to the most practical arrangement of initiatives organizations can use to inform
their HR practices.
Factors Affecting Organizational Gender Stratification
Both individual and organizational processes contribute to OGS in
organizations. Individual processes, such as differences in the careers chosen by
women (Wellington et al., 2003), are often blamed for the lack of female
representation in upper organizational levels. Organizational processes, such as
differences in developmental opportunities given to women (Women in the
Workplace, 2016), are also believed to play a subtle, yet crucial role in OGS. This
study examines five factors contributing to OGS. These factors are: (1) career
decisions, (2) familial effects, (3) bias in selection evaluations, (4) bias in
performance appraisal evaluations, and (5) differences in developmental
opportunities presented to men and women. The following section will discuss
these individual and organizational processes in detail.
Individual Decision Processes. Individual decisions play a fundamental
role in determining career paths (Wellington et al., 2003; Woodcock, Hernandez,
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Estrada, & Schultz, 2012). Two critical individual decision processes impacting
OGS are the pursuit of challenging jobs and work-life prioritization (Wellington
et al., 2003; Sandberg, 2013). If women and men systematically differ in their
individual decisions, then this generates pathways for the emergence of OGS in
organizations.
Career Decisions. Females are more likely to occupy staff positions in
organizations where they play a support role, such as in Human Resources (HR),
whereas males are more likely to occupy line positions where they receive greater
responsibility over factors influencing an organization’s profits or losses
(Catalyst, 2006). Importantly, experience in line positions provides crucial
experience for managerial careers (Wellington et al., 2003). One possible
explanation for females pursuing line positions with less frequency includes
domain disidentification in which individuals separate themselves from a
discipline due to chronic stereotype threat (Woodcock et al., 2012). An individual
reduces his or her social identity when stereotypes of a given group include
psychological and behavioral consequences for minority groups members, such as
minority group members reinforcing a given stereotype. Social identity threat may
differ amongst individuals as a result of situational cues regardless of a person’s
confidence in a given domain. For example, Murphy et al. (2007) examined the
influence of an individual underrepresented within a group (i.e., belonging to a
numerical minority). They found that when women were primed to feel as though
they belonged to the numerical minority, they reported feeling they did not belong
at a conference, and thus, were less inclined to participate at the conference as a
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result. The results from this study indicate that when women identify with a given
domain, they tend to rely on situational cues, such as numerical representation, to
obtain information on threats to their identities in reference to numerical
representation (Murphy et al., 2007). Furthermore, the simple influence of
gendering words in a masculine manner can also discourage women from
applying for certain jobs due to the feeling that women do not belong in these jobs
(Breaugh, 2013). If women tend to self-select out of positions deemed important
for higher-level positions in organizations, then this provides a pathway for the
emergence of OGS. Thus, it is imperative that women pursue line positions if they
wish to garner higher-level managerial positions.
Familial Effects. Another barrier women tend to face in their career
advancement stems from familial choices, such as deciding to have children. The
1993 Family and Medical Leave Act offers 12 weeks of unpaid leave for mothers
in the U.S. and guarantees an individual the same job or a job of similar rank upon
returning to work after taking leave (FML Report, 2012). Additionally, more
women tend to take leave compared to men as a result of conceiving a child (FML
Report, 2012). Although the passage of this act increases employment and
retention for women once they conceive a child, their wages often decrease upon
returning to work (Hofferth & Curtin, 2006). Multiple studies indicate that even
after controlling for age, work experience, and education, women receive lower
wages for choosing motherhood compared to those who do not (Waldfogel, 1996;
Avellar & Smock, 2003). Organizations also do not entice women to return to
work after conceiving children, and thus, this motherhood penalty may lead to
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women missing out opportunities to fulfill their leadership potential. In fact,
approximately 43% of women leave their jobs once conceiving children
(Sandberg, 2013), terminating a woman’s career progression and exacerbating
OGS in organizations. Systematic differences in the frequency with which women
and men take leave creates another pathway for the emergence of OGS. Taking a
leave of absence also relates to fewer promotions, lower salary, and lower
performance evaluations for the year in which an individual took leave (Judiesch
& Lyness, 1999), mothers especially. However, research finds men often receive
a performance bonus if they are fathers (Hodges & Budig, 2010).
Organizational Evaluation Processes. Organizational evaluations play a
role in determining career trajectories and organizational effectiveness (Eagly,
Makhijani, & Kloshy, 1992; DeNisi & Murphy, 2017). Three critical evaluative
organizational processes include selection, performance appraisals, and promotion
(Salgado, Viswesvaran, & Ones, 2001; DeNisi & Murphy, 2017; Cleveland,
Murphy, & William, 1989). If evaluative organizational processes function
differentially for men and women, then they provide multiple pathways for the
emergence of OGS with implications for organizational workforce potential.
Social role theory describes how individuals act in social situations, which
stems from their social roles (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Eagly, 1987). Social roles
provide descriptive information by conveying ways individuals act in a given
situation and prescriptive information that explains ways individuals should act
(Eagly, 1987). Social roles include gender roles (Eagly & Karau, 2002), where
men are thought to possess more agentic characteristics, such as being
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independent, dominant, and assertive (Wood & Eagly, 2012), and women are
thought to possess more communal characteristics, such as being affectionate,
sympathetic, and interpersonally sensitive (Bakan, 1966; Wood & Eagly, 2012).
Moreover, individuals typically think of agentic characteristics (e.g., competitive,
ambitious) when thinking of successful leaders (Schein 1973, 1975). Building on
social role theory, role congruity theory posits individuals tend to get evaluated
based on the amount of alignment they exhibit with their prescribed gender roles
(Eagly & Karau, 2002). Those possessing agentic characteristics more closely
resemble leaders, which results in incongruity when an individual does not align
with their gender-stereotypic characteristics. For example, thinking of a female
leader can elicit stereotypes about both women (i.e., communal characteristics)
and leaders (i.e., agentic characteristics), resulting in role incongruence (Eagly &
Karau, 2002), or a perceived lack of fit between being a female and being a
manager (Fiske, 1993).
These role expectations hold implications for selection, performance
evaluation, and promotion processes. According to leader categorization theory,
individuals form mental representations of leaders due to held perceptions (Lord,
Foti, & De Vader, 1984). Individuals use these schemas to classify the traits or
attributes expected of leaders into cognitive structures known as implicit
leadership theories (Offermann & Coats, 2018). Implicit leadership theories
(ILTs) can influence an individual’s behavioral expectations of a leader based on
some archetype of desired leader behaviors (Offermann & Coats, 2018). ILTs
influence leadership ratings with ratings biased by inaccurate representations of
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leader behaviors that might not necessarily be occurring (Shondrick & Lord,
2010; Offermann & Coats, 2018). While the “think manager, think male” mindset
(Schein, Muller, Lituchy, & Liu, 1996) may exist to a lesser degree with
approximately half of management jobs in the U.S. occupied by women (Catalyst,
2014), Offermann and Coats (2018) discuss differences in perceptions of creative
potential between men and women as a potential source of the limited number of
women occupying male-dominated jobs. Proudfoot, Kay, and Koval (2015) found
creativity more strongly tied to masculine characteristics compared to feminine
characteristics, and female executives are rated as less innovative than their male
counterparts. Offermann and Coats (2018) argue this helps shed light on the
scarce number of women in STEM (science, technology, engineering,
mathematics) careers due to a heightened emphasis placed on creativity and
innovation. Moreover, individuals tend to evaluate the women they view as
successful managers as also being more irrational and hostile than their male
counterparts (Heilman, Block, & Martell, 1995). As a result, this unconscious bias
exists in the screening and evaluation of female candidates for leadership roles,
making it more difficult for women to receive consideration for leadership roles
(Eagly & Karau, 2002). Recent research also finds the importance of implicit
followership theories (IFTs; Braun, Stegmann, Hernandez Bark, Junker, & van
Dick, 2017), or beliefs as to how followers should act, in that individuals use
social roles to evaluate who is a successful follower based on an individual’s
personal attributes. The follower role is comprised of being agentic and taskoriented, but also, places emphasis on person-orientation (Junker & van Dick,
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2014; Junker et al., 2016; Sy, 2010; Braun et al., 2017). Additionally, women are
held to higher expectations for acting in communal manners when evaluated
(Bear, Cushenbery, London, & Sherman, 2017). As a result, women are held to
IFTs and experience a “pull effect” towards follower roles due to alignment with
their gender roles, whereas men experience a “push effect” from follower roles,
pushing them into leadership positions due to better alignment with leadership
roles. This phenomenon, known as a “sticky floor,” restrains women into follower
positions due to the perceived congruence between being a female and being a
follower rather than a leader (Braun et al., 2017).
Women in line positions are also rated lowest compared to all other
management groups, such as women or men in staff positions, or men in line
positions (Lyness & Heilman, 2006). Women in these positions tend to
experience a disadvantage in performance evaluations compared to women in
staff positions and men in both line and staff positions. This finding limits the
potential for women to reach higher-level positions given the importance of
possessing line experience for managerial success (Wellington et al., 2003).
As a whole, these findings suggest that for women pursuing management
careers, gender bias can harm performance evaluations, and ultimately, hinder
promotional opportunities and career progression for women. Performance ratings
influence subsequent promotions, and research suggests women who receive
promotions obtain higher performance ratings compared to men who receive the
equivalent promotions (Lyness & Heilman, 2006). This implies that, in order for
women to receive promotions, they had to be viewed as more exceptional in their
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accomplishments compared to men. In other words, to be at the same level as
men, women must work harder than their male counterparts (Lyness & Heilman,
2006).
Selection Evaluation Bias. Organizations are more likely to hire men than
women, and this male advantage increases with each organizational level
(Women in the Workplace, 2016). As leadership roles become more prevalent
with increasing organizational levels, these findings are not surprising from a role
congruity perspective (Eagly & Karau, 2002). In other words, the closer women
are to upper management, the more perceived incongruity manifests when
evaluating women as leaders (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Additionally, due to
differences in career selection between men and women into line and staff
positions and how organizations more highly value line positions in comparison
to staff positions (Wellington et al., 2003), women in external labor pools are
disadvantaged when considered for open positions in an organization.
Performance Appraisal Evaluation Bias. Foschi’s (1992, 1996, 2000)
theory of double standards suggests that when evaluating performance,
individuals use a different set of standards to evaluate the same performance
based on gender to make a decision about an individual’s competence. Members
of lower status groups (in this case, women) are evaluated with stricter standards
for the same performance. As an example, research in the Netherlands finds
students to be biased against female lecturers in their performance ratings
(Mengel, Sauermann, & Zölitz, 2017). Female lecturers were rated lower than
male lecturers, even when the teaching materials used by the lecturers were
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exactly the same. Particularly surprising, students of the lecturers received similar
course grades, and course grades improved at similar rates for courses taught by
both male and female lecturers. Additionally, female lecturers received lower
ratings by both male and female students, and these ratings saw an even sharper
decline when the lecturer was a junior instructor (Mengel et al., 2017). Together,
these findings suggest prohibitive barriers to promotion as a result of biased
performance appraisal evaluations, which lead to lower overall performance
ratings. To the extent such biases exist in an organization, OGS may emerge.
The biases women experience in performance appraisal evaluations impact
promotion decisions. It is more difficult for women to receive promotions to
higher academic ranks compared to men, even after controlling for personal
attributes such as publication history and career breaks, supporting the notion that
women must work harder to receive outcomes on a similar level as men (Ward,
2001). For example, women do not receive promotions at the same rate as men:
for every 100 women promoted, approximately 130 men get promoted (Women in
the Workplace, 2016). Furthermore, if biases exist in performance appraisal
evaluations, organizations may fail to promote their top performers.
Differences in Opportunities. As discussed previously, women experience
differential selection, performance evaluation, and promotion processes. On
average, women receive work less challenging compared to men. Only 67% of
women (compared to 74% of men) report meaningfully partaking in meetings,
62% report receiving a challenging assignment (compared to 68% of men), and
only 56% (compared to 63% of men) report being asked for their opinion when it
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comes to important decisions (Women in the Workplace, 2016). Not only are
women less appreciated and trusted compared to men, but only 49% of women
(compared to 63% of men) report believing the input they give in their jobs is
truly valued (Women in the Workplace, 2016). When it comes to fairness
perceptions in the workplace, only 54% of women believe they are given equal
opportunities for growth compared to peers and only 44% of women believe that
opportunities in the workplace are allocated to the employees that truly deserve
them (Women in the Workplace, 2016). Moreover, 33% of women report feeling
difficulty in obtaining a raise, promotion, or advancing in their careers based on
their gender, which nearly triples the percentage of men who feel their gender
puts them at a disadvantage (Women in the Workplace, 2016). Kantola (2008)
describes this phenomenon as a gendered division of labor in that the
opportunities given to women are less valuable, often aligning with the female
gender role, such as organizing social events (Eagly & Karau, 2002). As a result,
women less often get the chance to display the necessary knowledge, skills, and
abilities to advance in organizations.
Women also are less inclined to ask for increased responsibility or
opportunities at work. Female Ph.D. students at Carnegie Mellon University
discovered the reason they were assigned as teaching assistants to other faculty
members while the male students were teaching their own courses was due to the
male students simply asking for this increased responsibility (Babcock &
Laschever, 2008). When women miss out on developmental opportunities, they
lose the chance to develop the necessary skills to prepare them for managerial
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success, which can cause women to be overlooked when it comes to promotions.
When an individual is passed over multiple times for various promotions, it
signals that he or she is not suitable for future promotions which lowers their
chances of being considered for future promotions (Martell et al., 2012).
As a result, it is crucial women receive developmental opportunities
within organizations to foster skills necessary to not only improve perceptions as
management material, but to successfully execute managerial roles. Feedback on
performance is also important for skill development and instrumental to an
individual’s learning, motivation (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996), goal attainment
(Schiemann, 2009), and job performance (Erez, 1977). Even when women are
presented with more opportunities in their jobs, they do not receive the necessary
feedback to successfully grow in their roles. For example, only 36% of female
employees reported receiving feedback “sometimes”, “often”, or “very often”
compared to 46% of the male employees. More specifically, 20% fewer women
reported receiving difficult feedback they felt was necessary for improving
performance (Women in the Workplace, 2016). Without developmental
opportunities or feedback on how one is performing, women cannot know where
they currently stand within an organization and may lack insight on how to
improve performance for increased responsibility in their jobs.
Summary. To summarize, women face barriers to career advancement at
all levels of the organizational hierarchy (Baxter & Wright, 2000; Elliott & Smith,
2004; Eagly, 2007), which partially results from biases in selection, performance
appraisal evaluation, and differences in developmental opportunities between men
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and women. Individual decisions, such as career and familial decisions, present
additional challenges to the career progression of women. Table 1 provides a
summary of the factors contributing to OGS. These factors result not only in
OGS, but also, can affect organizational workforce potential by failing to
accurately select and promote individuals based on true ability.
Table 1
Factors Influencing Organizational Gender Stratification.
Factors

Descriptions

Career Decisions Women hold more staff positions, where they
play a supporting role, whereas men hold more
line positions, where they hold greater
responsibility over an organization’s profits or
losses (Catalyst, 2006)

Process Level
Individual
Decision
Process

Familial Effects

More women take leave compared to men,
Individual
which holds implications for promotions, salary, Decision
and performance evaluations (Judiesch &
Process
Lyness, 1999); approximately 43% of women
leave after conceiving children (Sandberg,
2013)

Selection
Evaluation Bias

Lack of fit between being a female and being a
manager; men more likely hired into an
organization compared to women, and this male
advantage increases with each organizational
level (Fiske, 1993; Women in the Workplace,
2016)

Organizational
Process

Performance
Appraisal
Evaluation Bias

Foschi’s (1992, 1996, 2000) theory of double
standards states individuals use a different set of
standards to evaluate the same performance
based on gender; members of lower status
groups (e.g., women) get evaluated with stricter
standards for the same performance (Mengel et
al., 2017)

Organizational
Process

Differences in
Opportunities

Women given less challenging work and report
receiving less critical feedback than men;
women report feeling their input not truly
valued (Women in the Workplace, 2016);

Organizational
Process
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women seek fewer developmental opportunities
(Babcock & Laschever, 2008)

Human Resource Initiatives to Reduce Organizational Gender Stratification
The five factors discussed represent actions and decisions that may lead to
OGS. While not readily apparent that women receive fewer developmental
opportunities than men in organizations, this subtle difference can largely impact
the likelihood of developing the necessary skills to grow in one’s position and to
demonstrate the capability to succeed at the next organizational level.
Recognizing these subtleties exist is a step toward reducing OGS, and
organizations need to take action to combat these problematic effects, not only to
reduce OGS, but to increase organizational workforce potential. If organizations
do not promote their top talent due to reduced performance perceptions of
women, then organizational workforce potential suffers. Organizational gender
studies typically provide suggestions of how to reduce OGS in organizations but
fail to examine the effectiveness of HR initiatives to address the specified
problems (Anderson et al., 2015). By examining the effectiveness of HR
initiatives to reduce OGS in a formalized model, practitioners may better select
interventions for an organization. The following sections review potential HR
initiatives organizations can adopt to tackle each of the five factors contributing to
OGS.
Even the Playing Field. OGS begins with the career choices women and
men make. Women tend to occupy more staff positions, whereas men occupy
more line positions. Additionally, upper level managers are more likely to be
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selected from a line position pool (Catalyst, 2006; Wellington et al., 2013), thus
placing the starting line for women behind that of men. It is difficult to assess the
true impact and potential benefit of more women in managerial careers without
actively working to bring women into these roles. Addressing this phenomenon
requires an environment in which all employees feel safe, supported, and
confident to pursue career paths of their choosing without fear of failure or
backlash. One of the factors dissuading women from pursuing these careers is the
sense they belong to a numerical minority in managerial careers (Murphy et al.,
2007). Organizations can create an environment encouraging diversity, and
regardless of the current gender composition of the organization, women should
receive equal consideration as men for managerial positions. By creating an
environment where men and women can achieve success in managerial careers,
women should feel more confident to pursue stereotypically male careers, and this
will increase the number of women in the applicant pool for open positions. To
encourage women to pursue stereotypically masculine careers, organizations can
write job postings in a gender-neutral tone to avoid discouraging women from
applying (Breaugh, 2013). Moreover, organizational policies, such as affirmative
action, which encourage women to pursue opportunities, can increase the number
of women willing to enter competitive activities (Balafoutas & Sutter, 2012).
Taken together, this implies simply informing women they will compete in a fair
competition may increase the likelihood they will pursue situations they typically
might avoid.
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Remove the “Motherhood Penalty.” In comparison to other high-income
countries, the United States falls far behind in mandating paid maternity leave
(Gault, Hartmann, Hegewisch, Milli, & Reichlin, 2014). Research shows
providing paid leave for mothers increases the odds women will return to work
after conceiving a child, and also tends to reduce employer costs by increasing
employee retention (Gault et al., 2014). In 2013, approximately 87% of U.S.
employees from 11,893 worksites received access to unpaid family leave, whereas
only 12% received access to paid family leave (Gault et al., 2014). A few U.S.
states already adopted paid leave policies for new mothers (i.e., California, New
Jersey, Washington State, and Rhode Island) with varying amounts of pay
provided for women for different durations of leave (Gault et al., 2014).
Organizations retain more female employees after childbirth when they grant
women maternity benefits compared to when they do not grant such benefits
(Waldfogel, 1996), implying that inequities exist across companies for women in
relation to leave policies. For example, companies such as FaceBook, Netflix, and
Starbucks offer benefits for employed mothers, including paid leave and/or longer
leave periods. By providing paid medical leave, organizations can support
employees, which may increase retention and career progression for these
individuals (Boswell, Colvin, & Darnold, 2008).
Reduce Selection Bias. The bias women experience in pursuing career
goals begins with organizational selection decisions (Women in the Workplace,
2016). Individuals often rely on heuristics, or mental shortcuts, when making
decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), which helps explain why stereotypes
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persist. When hiring individuals for managerial positions, it is imperative that
those making the hiring decisions receive only relevant information during
screening of job applicants. If organizations utilize interviews during the hiring
process, then those making hiring decisions should receive training on how to use
only the necessary objective information to make a decision. Furthermore,
decision-makers should receive as much time as needed to make the proper hiring
decision to avoid the use of heuristics (i.e., stereotypes) in selecting candidates.
Organizations should conduct interviews in a standardized manner to
ensure consistency of evaluation across job candidates. In addition, interviews
should strive for objectivity, and tap into specific, behaviorally-oriented, and jobrelated criteria (Williamson, Campion, Malos, Roehling, & Campion, 1997).
Multiple interviewers improve reliability and validity of interviews, and generally
offer organizations protection against unlawful employment discrimination
(Williamson et al.,1997). Furthermore, to increase the consistency of interviews
across job candidates, employers should use multiple interview scales with
detailed anchor ratings, use the same interviewers for all job candidates, and
should not discuss the job candidate in question amongst interview raters to avoid
any non-job-related evaluations during the selection of job candidates (Campion,
Palmer, & Campion, 1997).
Reduce Performance Appraisal Evaluation Bias. To lessen bias in
performance evaluations, organizations can give individuals providing employee
ratings more performance information to allow for more accurate ratings as well
as allowing uninterrupted time for making evaluations and increasing rater
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accountability (Roberson et al., 2007). Organizations can use multi-rater systems
to avoid bias from a single individual, as well as encouraging managers to build
trust and relationships with all subordinates, regardless of gender (Applebaum,
Roy, & Gilliand, 2011).
To increase the accuracy of performance evaluation ratings, organizations
can provide frame of reference (FOR) training (Hauenstein, 1998). FOR training
involves defining performance dimensions to rate individuals and providing
examples of behavioral incidents to illustrate the desired behavior of each
dimension. FOR training provides raters with the necessary standards to evaluate
employees fairly by focusing on accuracy of performance evaluation decisions.
Research suggests FOR is an effective strategy for training raters to increase not
only the behavioral accuracy represented in a rater’s mind, but also the accuracy
of the performance evaluation rating itself (Woeher & Huffcutt, 1994).
Raters can also receive training on using methods shown to reduce gender
bias. Structured free recall (SFR) asks raters to consider both positive and
negative behaviors that an individual enacts to avoid basing ratings of an
individual on general evaluations (Anderson et al., 2015). Bauer and Baltes
(2002) found this method reduces bias against females when their performance
gets evaluated. Under source monitoring (SM), raters differentiate between
“known” and “remembered” judgments. Raters tend to view remembered
judgments as more objective, or not influenced by personal thoughts and feelings,
and therefore, less influenced by behavioral expectations (Anderson et al., 2015).
Error management training (EMT) initiates an active learning process where
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raters make errors so they can learn from the errors to promote self-regulation in
their behavior (Anderson et al., 2015). Organizations can adopt any of these ratertraining approaches to bring gender bias-awareness to employees to reduce rating
errors.
Organizations often rely on performance evaluations to make promotion
decisions (Cleveland et al., 1989). Research finds a promotion bias amongst men
such that men prefer to support and promote male leaders (Bosak & Sczeny,
2011), which results in a self-perpetuating cycle of male-dominated management
(Braun et al., 2017). Thus it is imperative that organizations make promotion
decisions through a fair process. As mentioned previously, bias in performance
evaluation ratings can be reduced by using various rater training strategies (i.e.,
FOR training, SFR, SM, EMT). By adopting these training methods to avoid bias
in performance appraisal evaluations, those providing performance appraisal
evaluations will base evaluations on more objective information by focusing on
concrete, observed behaviors. As a result, ideally the candidates considered for
promotions truly perform well in their current jobs, and thus, are best suited for a
promotion.
Provide Equal Opportunities. Even if women pursue jobs needed for
managerial careers, receive equal chances for hiring, and are evaluated without
bias, women may not receive the same developmental opportunities as men in the
same jobs (Women in the Workplace, 2016). At the same time, women do not ask
for developmental opportunities at the same rate as men (Babcock & Laschever,
2008). This keeps women behind in development for top management positions.
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Organizations need to track who receives developmental opportunities at work,
and women need to actively seek out opportunities by asking their managers for
greater responsibilities. Women need feedback on work performance and needs
for improvement. Every employee, namely supervisors and managers, should feel
safe to provide feedback to both women and men with the same quality and focus
on developing an individual’s skills. A proposed solution to equate developmental
opportunities for men and women includes three components: (1) bringing
awareness to differences in opportunity seeking propensity between men and
women; (2) organizations equitably managing opportunities for training and
development; (3) organizations equitably providing feedback to facilitate
learning, motivation, (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996) and goal attainment (Schiemann,
2009), all critical for job performance (Payne, Youngcourt, & Beaubien, 2007).
Summary. Adopting HR initiatives to combat factors contributing to OGS
serves two purposes. First, diversifying the leadership styles present in an
organization can beneficially impact organizational success. Although research
suggests increased diversity may not always lead to optimal performance,
increasing gender diversity in organizations helps organizations expand their
talent pool, increase employee satisfaction, and improve decision-making by
enhancing creative perspectives (Hunt, Layton, & Prince, 2015). Moreover, with
organizations adopting flatter organizational structures (e.g., Google; Gupta,
2016), where cooperation and coordination prove essential, participative
leadership styles (i.e., styles exhibited by women) may prove more beneficial to
these organizational structures due to more teams-based management (Applebaum
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et al., 2003). Thus, female leaders can offer strategic value to organizations.
Second, when evaluating females for leadership roles, biases held against women
hold implications for organizational workforce potential. By evaluating females
lower than males in organizations, and by overlooking individuals with lower
performance evaluations, individuals with the highest perceived performance get
selected and promoted to higher levels within the organization rather than those
who truly perform the best. Thus, organizations may achieve sub-optimal
performance levels due to not hiring and promoting the true top performers.
Although the mechanism of the connection remains unclear, organizations with
women in leadership positions tend to achieve effective financial organizational
performance (Hoobler et al., 2016).
Organizations may adopt HR initiatives independently or in conjunction
with other HR initiatives. While the HR initiatives reviewed all hold implications
for OGS and workforce potential (see Table 2 for a summary), they do require
time and effort by organizations. To influence career decisions of individuals,
organizations may minimally alter current recruitment strategies by adjusting job
postings to gender-neutral language (Breaugh, 2013). Providing paid maternity
leave for women can potentially save organizations money by increasing
employee retention after taking leave (Gault et al., 2014). Reducing selection bias
involves allotting time and resources to properly structure the interview process
and to train interviewers to accurately assess job candidates. Reducing
performance evaluation bias requires a similar process in which raters need to
receive training on how to accurately document and rate performance behaviors,
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which involves investing resources and time into these processes. Reducing bias
in promotions requires organizations to track current promotion processes and to
ensure promotion decisions stem from accurate information. Finally, providing
equal opportunities to males and females requires organizations to track who
receives developmental opportunities, irrespective of who asks for them.
Table 2
Description of Human Resource Initiatives.
Factor

HR Initiative

Even the Playing Field

Gender neutral job postings (Breaugh, 2013);
affirmative action for line position jobs (Balafoutas &
Sutter, 2012)

Remove the
“Motherhood Penalty”

Providing better medical leave (e.g., paid leave;
Boswell, Colvin, & Darnold, 2008)

Reduce Selection Bias

Training for selection decisions; standardized
interview process; multiple interviewers (Williamson
et al.,1997; Campion et al., 1997)

Reduce Performance
Evaluation Bias

Multi-rater performance appraisal systems; FOR
training (Hauenstein, 1998); SFR, SM, EMT
(Anderson et al., 2015)

Provide Equal
Opportunities

Provide equal opportunities for increased
responsibility (Babcock & Laschever, 2008); provide
constructive feedback through performance
management (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996)

Critical Factors for Organizational Workforce Potential
In understanding organizational workforce potential, organizations need to
consider individual contributions to organizational objectives and goals.
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Organizations need to evaluate individual contributions to organizational
objectives from multiple perspectives including the execution and performance of
normal job duties, and, especially in the context of considering individuals for
promotions to higher-level (i.e., managerial) positions, leadership quality.
Individual performance behaviors involve job-related activities that contribute to
an employee’s formal organizational role. In formal organizational roles,
employees enact performance behaviors to accomplish tasks, duties, and
responsibilities (TDRs) for their position. The execution of TDRs by employees
serves as a fundamental contributor to organizational productivity (Ostroff, 1992).
Naturally, another fundamental contributor to organizational effectiveness comes
from managers enacting leadership behaviors. Not surprisingly, leadership
effectiveness contributes to organizational performance (Jing & Avery, 2008).
Furthermore, research findings suggest the quality of leadership exhibited by
managers results in performance improvements of employees, especially in light
of competitive organizational dynamics (Avolio, 1999; Lado, Boyd, & Wright,
1992; McGrath & MacMillan, 2000; Rowe, 2001; Tecee, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).
Thus, in order for organizations to successfully achieve organizational objectives
and goals, organizations need employees who can successfully execute normal
job duties and possess the potential to effectively lead fellow organizational
members to accomplish stated organizational objectives and goals. Organizations
that effectively reward such competencies will achieve superior organizational
performance (Becker, Huselid, & Beatty, 2009).
Using Computational Modeling to Investigate Gender Stratification

28

OGS in organizations manifests as an emergent phenomenon where the
consequences of behavior at the micro-level lead to macro-level effects (Martell
et al., 2012). Previous research isolated various factors contributing to the lack of
women in managerial positions but only limitedly examined their combinatorial
effects. While empirical researchers examine how a set of factors relate to key
outcomes, an often-neglected area of study in industrial and organizational
psychology involves representing the interactive processes stemming from
mechanisms underlying phenomena of interest (Kozlowski, Chao, Grand, Braun,
& Kuljanin, 2013). For example, bias in performance appraisal serves as a
contributing factor for why so few women in top management positions, yet it
constitutes one piece to a complex, multidimensional, multilevel, and dynamic
puzzle. Investigating the combinatorial and dynamic effects of these factors in a
standard research setting necessitates first a thorough theoretical investigation. To
achieve such a thorough theoretical investigation, I utilize computational
modeling as an integrative approach to studying OGS.
Computational Modeling
Researchers traditionally examine psychological phenomena through
narrative theory or limited empirical data investigations in industrial and
organizational psychology. These approaches cannot sufficiently assess multiple
interdependent processes operating simultaneously (Harrison et al., 2007;
Kozlowski et al., 2013). To address this issue, researchers can utilize computer
simulations to examine processes unfolding over time as a function of a set of
inputs (Harrison et al., 2007). Computational models convert narrative theory of
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psychological processes into a computer program to investigate theoretical logic,
predictions, and implications (Kozlowski et al., 2013). Formulating a
computational model involves utilizing equations, algorithms, and/or logical
statements (Grand et al., 2016). Computational modeling allows researchers to
build and assess theory, examine factors and processes underlying large-scale
stratification in organizations, and design and assess potential interventions to
resolve a persistent organizational problem (Martell et al., 2012).
Computer-based simulations of organizations can model both micro- and
macro-level phenomena. Micro-phenomena represent ongoing processes at a
lower-level of analysis (e.g., individuals) whereas macro-phenomena (e.g.,
organizational processes) represent situational constraints acting on lower-levels.
Similarly, bottom-up phenomena originate at lower levels (e.g., individual) and
exhibit emergent properties at higher levels (e.g., organizational; Kozlowski &
Klein, 2000). Given the common representation of organizations as a multi-level
system, OGS emerges as a result of interacting bottom-up and top-down
processes. In the current study, individual- (i.e., career decisions and familial
effects) and organizational-level processes (i.e., selection decisions, performance
appraisals, and developmental opportunities) simultaneously contribute to the
emergence of OGS and workforce potential.
Previous research utilized computational modeling to examine OGS.
Martell et al. (1996) focused on organizational factors that influence OGS by
assessing gender bias in performance ratings at various levels within an
organization. They programmed an evaluation bias favoring male performance in
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organizations to account for 1% and 5% of the variance in performance ratings
which was used to make promotion decisions. Adding 2.01 bias points to
performance of males accounted for 1% of variance in performance evaluations,
and adding 4.58 bias points to performance of males accounted for 5% of variance
in performance evaluations. Adding bias in favor of males to account for just 1%
of the variance in performance evaluations resulted in females occupying only
35% of the highest-level management positions in the simulated organization
(Martell et al., 1996).
Robison-Cox et al. (2007) expanded Martell et al.’s (1996) model by
including differences between males and females in work experience, attrition,
career delays, external versus internal hires, and risk-taking behavior in
conjunction with bias in performance evaluations. Robison-Cox et al. (2007)
defined work experience as an individual holding either a line or staff position in
an organization. They also included differential attrition rates such that males and
females left an organization for reasons including a lack of job opportunity at the
current organization, job opportunities available at different organizations, and/or
personal, family, or health reasons. Differences in career delays was defined as
the possibility of a woman taking a year off for maternity leave. The authors also
modeled risk-taking behavior, which represented increased risk-taking of males
resulting in greater variance in performance evaluations for males. Robison-Cox
et al. (2007) found these five additional factors did not produce OGS alone;
rather, their combinatorial effects led to varying amounts of OGS in
organizations.
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Samuelson et al. (2018) also examined how both bottom-up (i.e.,
interpersonal) and top-down (i.e., contextual) processes interact to produce OGS
with an agent-based simulation to focus on the interactive effects of
developmental opportunities and external hiring rates of females in comparison to
males. Both developmental opportunities and external hiring rates contributed to
OGS by influencing the rate at which females voluntarily left the organization.
The present study seeks to continue this line of research using computational
modeling to comprehensively understand the processes impacting OGS and
provide organizations an explanation of how OGS manifests, and evaluate ways
organizations may combat negative outcomes from these processes to reduce
OGS and positively impact organizational workforce potential.
Research Focus
This study examined how top-down (i.e., selection, performance appraisal,
and developmental opportunities) and bottom-up processes (i.e., career and
familial decisions) interact dynamically to produce OGS and limit women in
upper level management using a computational model. The OGS model
incorporated a set of factors as model parameters to examine their interactive
effects in impacting OGS and workforce potential. Organizational workforce
potential, defined in this study as the average of true ability of employees in an
organization (Scullen, Bergey, & Aiman-Smith, 2005), is negatively affected
when certain groups experience bias in the workplace. If women are rated lower
on performance compared to men, they will tend to be overlooked when making
promotional decisions. As a result, an organization may not promote its best
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talent, and thus, organizational workforce potential can suffer. This study utilized
two virtual experiments to understand the process of OGS and examine potential
organizational interventions to reduce OGS. For each virtual experiment, a
hierarchically-structured organization was initialized containing individuals with
varying characteristics, including gender, age, retirement age, ability, and
leadership quality. The first virtual experiment explored the theoretical space in
which the OGS model parameters (i.e., OGS factors) operate. The second virtual
experiment examined the effectiveness of HR initiatives designed to combat
factors leading to OGS.
Virtual Experiment 1
The first virtual experiment (VE1) examines the theoretical space in which
the OGS factors operate independently and simultaneously. VE1 assesses the
effects of the model parameters by altering the parameter values. The model
parameters in VE1 include: career decisions, familial effects, selection bias,
performance appraisal evaluation bias, and differences in opportunities. VE1
allows for the alteration of the values comprising these factors in the model to
examine how OGS unfolds over time, as well as the implications this holds for
organizational workforce potential. Throughout VE1, it is suspected that due to
the biases held against women in organizations, simulated organizations will not
always promote or hire the top candidates due to incorrect perceptions of how an
individual truly performs. Additionally, the simulation calculates OGS each
simulated year to examine how OGS unfolds over time as a function of these
contributing factors. While certain factors may subtly contribute to OGS, their
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combinatorial effects were suspected to cumulatively exacerbate OGS over time.
Thus, I propose:
Proposition I: Over time, organizational gender stratification will occur
most severely in the upper levels of the organization.
Proposition II: Over time, perceived organizational performance will
exceed true organizational performance in the presence of organizational gender
stratification.
Virtual Experiment 2
The second virtual experiment (VE2) explores how altering the factors
that affect OGS influence OGS and workforce potential. Following VE1, VE2
enacts HR initiatives, organized into bundles based on similarity between HR
initiatives, to combat each of the OGS factors. The HR bundles represent
underlying themes for organizations to consider when attempting to reduce OGS.
The first bundle, “Combating Bias,” addresses the bias that women experience
during selection and performance appraisal processes. The second bundle, “Equal
Opportunities”, addresses the differences in developmental opportunities as well
as the familial effects women experience throughout their careers. The final
bundle, “Even the Playing Field,” addresses the career decisions made by women.
Table 3 provides an outline of each bundle.
Table 3
Human Resource Initiative Bundles Designed to Reduce Organizational Gender
Stratification.
HR Bundle

HR Initiative

Rationale
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Bundle 1:
Combating Bias

Reduce Selection Bias
Reduce Performance
Evaluation Bias

To address bias in
selection and performance
appraisal against women

Bundle 2: Equal
Opportunities

Provide Equal Opportunities
Remove the “Motherhood”
Penalty

To address differences in
developmental
opportunities and familial
effects

Bundle 3: Even
the Playing Field

Even the Playing Field

To address the career
choices of women

Grouping HR initiatives into bundles allows for an examination of how
effectively related HR initiatives reduce OGS and improve organizational
workforce potential. I propose the following research questions to explore the
effectiveness of the three HR bundles:
RQI: How and to what extent does reducing biases in (a) selection and (b)
performance appraisal influence organizational gender stratification and
organizational workforce potential?
RQII: How and to what extent does providing (a) equal developmental
opportunities to males and females and (b) improved medical leave policies to
employees influence organizational gender stratification and organizational
workforce potential?
RQIII: How and to what extent does placing more women in line positions
compared to staff positions influence organizational gender stratification and
organizational workforce potential?
Method
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This study examines five factors that produce OGS: (1) career decisions,
(2) familial decisions, (3) selection bias, (4) performance appraisal evaluation
bias, and (5) differences in opportunities. These factors are examined with respect
to OGS and workforce potential. This study consists of two virtual experiments.
The first virtual experiment examines the theoretical space in which the OGS
factors operate by varying the model parameters to assess how they differentially
impact OGS and workforce potential. The second virtual experiment explores the
impact of HR initiatives designed to combat each of the OGS factors by altering
the initial model parameters based on the bundle instantiated. This study evaluates
the effectiveness of HR initiatives to reduce OGS and improve organizational
workforce potential.
Simulation Set-Up
Virtual Experiments 1 and 2 utilize the same simulation set-up. First, the
simulation sets the organizational life-cycle. Previous models of OGS used the
number of years it takes to replace the organization with entirely new individuals
(e.g., Samuelson et al., 2018) and find it takes approximately 36 years to do so, or
used duration for organizational performance to reach equilibrium (Robison-Cox
et al., 2007) and find it takes approximately 50 years for performance to plateau.
Using these simulations as guidance, the simulated organizations in this study ran
for 40 years for any given simulation run. The organizations were initialized with
six levels, split into 50% line positions and 50% staff positions (Samuelson et al.,
2018). Levels 1-3 represent the upper levels of the organization while levels 4-6
represent the lower levels. The number of employees set in the simulation is
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11,490 to model a moderately large organization (Robison-Cox et al., 2007).
Individuals in the simulation are assigned individual characteristics, which
include gender, ability, leadership potential, age, and retirement age. At the start
of any simulation run, the organization consists of 50% males and 50% females at
all levels of the organization. Agent task ability and leadership potential are both
drawn from a normal distribution with M = 100 and SD = 15, with upper and
lower bounds set to 130 and 70, respectively. Agent age is drawn from a normal
distribution, with the average age in the upper levels of the organization as M =
55, and the average age in the lower levels of the organization as M = 35, given
employees in lower organizational levels tend to be younger in comparison to
those working in upper-levels (U.S. Department of Labor, 2016). Agent
retirement age is drawn from a normal distribution with M = 65 and SD = 2, with
a lower bound set to 55. Agents in the external labor pool are hired based on their
task ability, using the same sampling procedures for initializing the organization.
Virtual Experiment 1
Independent Variables (Factors). The OGS simulation consists of five
parameters that model the factors contributing to OGS. These factors include
differences in career selection, familial effects, bias in selection, bias in
performance appraisal evaluation, and differences in developmental opportunities.
These parameters were free to vary during VE1 to allow for an examination of
how each of the factors interactively impact the outcomes of interest (i.e., OGS
and organizational workforce potential). Within VE1, three conditions were
created: no bias, low bias, and high bias. Parameters within these conditions were
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altered to model the OGS processes that unfold within organizations with low bias
and high bias operating, and to obtain an idealized organization without any OGS
occurring.
Career Decisions. VE1 altered the number of women occupying line and
staff positions to assess the impact of career decisions on the outcomes of interest.
Previous models set the proportion of women in line positions to 30%, and the
proportion of women in staff positions to 70% for OGS simulation (Catalyst,
2007; Robison-Cox et al., 2007; Samuelson et al., 2018). In VE1, women
comprised between 10% and 50% of line positions depending on the simulation
condition and organizational level, with the remaining number of women
occupying staff positions. See Table 4 for exact career decision parameters.
Table 4
Proportion of Females Selected for Line Positions by Simulation Condition and
Organizational Level.
Organizational Level
Simulation
condition

1

2

3

4

5

6

No Bias

.50

.50

.50

.50

.50

.50

Low Bias

.25

.35

.40

.45

.45

.50

High Bias

.10

.15

.20

.25

.30

.50

Familial Effects. Previous computational models of OGS include a
mechanism in which women have a set probability (e.g., 0.20) of removal from
the internal labor pool in a given year to model the effects of taking maternity
leave (i.e., Robison-Cox et al., 2007). Additionally, research shows a number of
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women voluntarily leave their jobs once conceiving children. The 2012 Family
Medical Leave Act, based on a 2011 a survey of 1,812 worksites across the U.S.,
found approximately 11% of men and 15% of women take leave in a 12-month
period (FML Report, 2012). Additionally, previous research has noted women
voluntarily turning over as a result of taking leave is approximately 40%
(Sandberg, 2013). In VE1, the rates at which men and women took leave was set
to 11% and 15% for the low and high bias conditions, and set to 13% for both
males and females in the no bias condition. VE1 also examined different
probabilities of turnover as a result of taking leave based on simulation condition,
ranging between 10% and 40%. See Table 5 for exact familial effect parameters.
Table 5
Proportion of Males and Females Taking Leave, and Subsequently Leaving an
Organization.
Simulation
Condition

Proportion taking leave

Probability of turnover resulting
from taking leave

Male

Female

Male

Female

No Bias

.13

.13

.20

.20

Low Bias

.11

.15

.15

.30

High Bias

.11

.15

.10

.40

Selection Bias. Previous models of OGS arbitrarily set the probability of
external hires and the proportion of males in the external labor pool (Robison-Cox
et al., 2007). In VE1, the probability of external hires was set to .30, .30, .25, .20,
.10, and 1 for levels one through six, respectively (adapted from Robison-Cox et
al., 2007). To account for external hiring bias against women, VE1 altered the
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external hiring probability of women based on the simulation condition and
organizational level. See Table 6 for exact selection bias parameters.
Table 6
Selection Probabilities of Females by Simulation Condition and Organizational
Level.
Organizational Level

Simulation
condition

1

2

3

4

5

6

No Bias

.50

.50

.50

.50

.50

.50

Low Bias

.25

.35

.40

.45

.45

.50

High Bias

.10

.15

.20

.25

.30

.50

Performance Appraisal Evaluation Bias. Performance evaluation scores
were assigned at the start of each performance cycle (i.e., year) and represent the
perceived ability of the agents by the organizations in the simulation. First, job
performance of the agents was calculated which averages how well agents
perform their traditional job duties and how they develop their performance based
on developmental opportunities. Performance of normal job duties was sampled
from an average of two values: an agent’s yearly ability, drawn from a normal
distribution with M = an agent’s task ability (sampled previously), and an agent’s
gender-by-position score. The gender-by-position score was designed to model
preference for (a) males and (b) line experience when making promotion

40

decisions. Each individual throughout the simulation was assigned a gender score
(i.e., 0-4) and a position score (i.e., 0-4) based on their gender and position in the
organization. These two scores were combined to create the gender-by-position
score, which was added to an individual’s average task ability and used to sample
performance on normal job duties. See Table 7 for exact gender-by-position score
assignments.

Table 7
Bias Values for Gender and Line/Staff Positions by Simulation Condition.
Simulation
Condition

Gender

Position

Gender-by-Position Score

Male

Female

Line

Staff

Male/ Female/ Male
line
line
/staff

Female
/staff

No Bias

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

Low Bias

3

1

3

1

6

4

4

2

High Bias

4

0

4

0

8

4

4

0

Agents selected to take leave in a given year also experienced a point
reduction in performance evaluation scores to model bias against agents taking
leave in a given year (Judiesch & Lyness, 1999). The amount of points added to
or removed from performance appraisal evaluations of men and women was
selected based on the product of (a) the variance in job performance for the year
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and (b) the variance in job performance selected specifically based on simulation
condition and gender. These values will be subtracted from female job
performance to model the motherhood penalty and will be added to male job
performance to model bonus males receive once returning to work after having
children (Hodges & Budig, 2010). See Table 8 for exact variance in performance
evaluation for males and females taking leave based on leave by gender
parameters.

Table 8
Variance in Performance Evaluation Bias for Having Children.
Variance in performance evaluations
Simulation
Condition

Males

Females

No Bias

0

0

Low Bias

.03

.07

High Bias

.03

.10

Differences in Opportunities. Males and females experience differences
in developmental opportunities presented within organizations such that males are
given more opportunities to contribute meaningfully at work and receive more
feedback on their performance (Women in the Workplace, 2016). Based on this
notion, individuals were assigned opportunity seeking propensities and
opportunity presentation values, both drawn from a normal distribution with M =
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6 developmental opportunities sought and available in a given year. The value of
six developmental opportunities was based on previous OGS simulations offering
agents a 50% chance of being presented with a developmental opportunity each
month in a given year (Samuelson et al., 2018). Males received either 0, 3, or 5
bias points added to the mean of their opportunity seeking propensities, and the
mean of the opportunities presented to them depending on the simulation
condition to model the increased amount of opportunities/feedback both sought by
and provided to males. See Table 9 for exact bias points added to male
opportunity seeking and opportunity presentation by simulation condition.

Table 9
Bias Added to Male Opportunity Seeking and Opportunity Presentation by
Simulation Run.
Males
Simulation
condition

Opportunity Seeking

Opportunity Presentation

No Bias

0

0

Low Bias

3

3

High Bias

5

5

To model differences in the value of opportunities presented to males and
females, developmental opportunities taken by individuals were selected based on
changing values for gender and simulation condition. See Table 10 for exact
values used for developmental opportunities by gender and condition.
Table 10
Value of Developmental Opportunities Provided to Males and Females.
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Value given to developmental opportunities

Simulation
condition

Males

Females

No Bias

1

1

Low Bias

1

.50

High Bias

1.2

.30

Additionally, the simulations kept track of how long an agent remains at a
given organizational level to model increased likelihood of turnover due to lack of
developmental opportunities (i.e., being passed over multiple times for
promotions signals an individual is not suitable for future promotions, thus
lowering their chances of being considered for future promotions; Martell et al.,
2012; Robison-Cox et al., 2007). If an agent was promoted in a given year, level
tenure was reset to zero. If an agent was not promoted, level tenure was increased
by one year. When an agent’s level tenure exceeded 4 years, he or she had an
increased probability (i.e., 40%) of voluntarily leaving the organization.
Virtual Experiment 2
Independent Variables (HR Initiatives). The HR initiatives in Virtual
Experiment 2 (VE2) altered the model parameters investigated in VE1 with the
goal of reducing OGS and increasing organizational workforce potential. The first
bundle of HR initiatives (Combating Bias) targeted the parameters that influence
bias in selection and performance evaluation. The second bundle of HR initiatives
(Equal Opportunities) targeted the parameters that influence differences in how
developmental opportunities are sought and presented by females, as well as the
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likelihood that agents would not return to work after having children. The final
bundle of HR initiatives (Even the Playing Field) targeted the parameters that
assign males and females to line and staff positions.
Bundle 1: Combating bias. This bundle captured how biased evaluation
of females impacts career advancement. First, females experience bias in selection
procedures which harms their chances of being selected into managerial careers.
Additionally, females experience bias in performance evaluation where
individuals make decisions about the competence of women in their jobs.
Performance evaluation ratings consequently have implications for which
individuals are promoted in an organization. Within the simulation, this bundle
equalized the proportion of females selected from the external labor pool by
setting a parameter to hire males and females at equal rates (reducing selection
bias). This bundle also removed the bias in performance evaluations. As a result,
females were not evaluated more negatively than men for taking leave, and their
gender-by-position scores were equalized. Performance evaluation scores became
their true score as opposed to their perceived ability scores (reducing performance
appraisal evaluation bias). Bias in promotion rates of males and females was
reduced as a result of eliminating bias in performance evaluation scores for
females.
Bundle 2: Equal opportunities. This second bundle of HR initiatives was
designed to remove barriers females experience throughout their careers. This
bundle consisted of providing equal opportunities for development to males and
females in addition to providing constructive feedback through performance
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management to address differences in training and developmental opportunities.
This mechanism removed the bias favoring males in the presentation of
developmental opportunities. In addition, this initiative set opportunity seeking
propensities of males and females to be equal, on average, to model how
encouraging women to ask for opportunities at similar rates to men helps increase
developmental opportunities presented to agents. This bundle also modeled
implementing parental leave policies that entice females to return to work after
conceiving children to address familial effects females experience. Within the
model, a small proportion of females selected to conceive children in a given year
voluntarily left the organization. With this HR initiative, males and females left
the organization due to taking parental leave at equal rates.
Bundle 3: Even the playing field. The underlying theme of this bundle is
to encourage females to pursue managerial careers and to remain in them. This
bundle laid a foundation for decreasing OGS by bringing more females into
careers that set them up for leadership paths initially. This bundle modeled the act
of organizations attracting a more diverse job candidate pool and helping females
recognize their full potential in managerial careers. Within the model, females
were equally represented in line positions throughout their lifespan in the
organization, both in the internal and external labor pools. Tables 11-17 show
how the parameters were altered for each simulated bundle.
Table 11
Proportions of Females in Line Positions by Simulation Run and Organizational
Level.
Organizational Level
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Simulation
condition

1

2

3

4

5

6

Bundle 1

.25

.35

.40

.45

.45

.50

Bundle 2

.25

.35

.40

.45

.45

.50

Bundle 3

.50

.50

.50

.50

.50

.50

Table 12
Proportion of Males and Females Taking Parental Leave, and Subsequently
Leaving an Organization.
Simulation
Condition

Proportion taking leave

Probability of turnover resulting
from taking leave

Male

Female

Male

Female

Bundle 1

.11

.15

.15

.30

Bundle 2

.11

.15

.15

.30

Bundle 3

.11

.15

.15

.15

Table 13
Selection Probabilities of Females by Simulation Run and Organizational Level.
Organizational Level
Simulation
condition

1

2

3

4

5

6

Bundle 1

.50

.50

.50

.50

.50

.50

Bundle 2

.25

.35

.40

.45

.45

.50

Bundle 3

.25

.35

.40

.45

.45

.50

Table 14
Biases for Gender and Line/Staff Positions.
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Simulation
Condition

Gender

Position
Staff

Gender-by-Position Score

Male

Female

Line

Male/ Female/ Male Female/
line
line
/staff
staff

Bundle 1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

Bundle 2

3

1

3

1

6

4

4

2

Bundle 3

3

1

3

1

6

4

4

2

Table 15
Variance in Performance Evaluation for Taking Parental Leave.
Variance in performance evaluations
Simulation
condition

Males

Females

Bundle 1

0

0

Low Bias

.03

.07

High Bias

.03

.07

Table 16
Bias Added to Male Opportunity Seeking and Opportunity Presentation by
Simulation Condition.
Males
Simulation
condition

Opportunity Seeking

Opportunity Presentation

Bundle 1

3

3

Bundle 2

0

0

Bundle 3

3

3

Table 17
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Difference in Values Given to Developmental Opportunities of Males and
Females by Simulation Condition and Gender.
Value given to developmental opportunities
Simulation
condition

Males

Females

Bundle 1

1

.50

Bundle 2

1

1

Bundle 3

1

.50

Dependent Variables
The outcomes of interest for both VE1 and VE2 were OGS and
organizational workforce potential. The model served to examine how OGS
dynamically manifests in organizations and how OGS impacts organizational
workforce potential.
Organizational Gender Stratification. OGS was calculated as the
average proportion of males and females present in each organizational level in
each year across 1,000 simulated organizations.
Organizational Workforce Potential. Organizational workforce potential
was calculated in two ways. Previous research states that aggregation of employee
knowledge, skills, and abilities contribute to a firm’s performance due to human
capital resources accumulation (Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011). True organizational
performance was calculated as the average of all employees’ true job performance
by level across 1,000 simulated organizations. Perceived organizational
performance was calculated based on performance evaluations of the agents by
level across 1,000 simulated organizations. This modeled how perceptions of
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individual performance based on biased evaluations influence the view of overall
organizational workforce potential. These two values are compared to examine
how well an organization thinks it is doing (perceived organizational
performance) compared to how well an organization is actually doing (true
organizational performance). If organizations are promoting individuals based on
perceived performance rather than true performance, and perceived performance
favors males irrespective of true performance, then organizations are not
promoting their best talent, and thus, are underperforming.
Simulation Algorithm Description
Both VE1 and VE2 followed the same simulation algorithm. The
difference between the virtual experiments is seen in the alteration of the model
parameters. The following section provides an outline of each step in the
simulation. Within each step, the parameters discussed varied depending on (a)
the virtual experiment being conducted and (b) the conditions within the virtual
experiments. Table 18 provides a general pseudo-code for the present model, and
Figure 1 provides a visual of the present simulation procedure. Additionally, the
simulation steps are listed below:
1. Model parameters were set initially. Model parameters included:
○ Organizational life-cycle set to 40 years.
○ The base number of opportunities available in a given year;
○ Bias values for opportunity seeking, opportunities
presented, and gender and position values;
○ Selection probabilities of females;
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○ Proportion of males and females taking leave in a given
year;
○ Variance in performance evaluations for individuals taking
leave in a given year;
○ Proportion of individuals taking leave that voluntarily
turnover;
○ Probability of voluntary turnover based on organizational
level tenure.
○ For VE1, these values are altered to examine their
individual and combinatorial effects; for VE2, these values
are equalized for males and females depending on the HR
initiative being examined to model the implementation of
various HR initiatives.
2. An organization is created, consisting of six levels (C-suite, SVP,
VP, Senior Manager, Manager, and Entry Level) split into 50%
line and 50% staff positions containing 11,490 employees total.
3. The organization is filled with individuals occupying line and staff
positions. Individuals are assigned individual characteristics,
including gender, ability, leadership potential, age, and retirement
age.
4. The simulation begins with an incrementation in the time clock
(year) to year = year + 1.
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5. Individuals are assigned a gender score, a position score, and a
gender-by-position score.
6. Leadership potential is computed for each individual.
7. Developmental opportunities presented and taken by individuals is
selected for the year. The opportunities taken are assigned a value
depending on gender.
8. Performance on normal job duties and developmental opportunities
taken is computed. Performance evaluations are conducted.
9. Proportion of males and females taking leave in a given year is
sampled. Leave bias is computed and added/subtracted to
performance evaluation scores.
10. Simulation outputs are calculated: count of males and females, true
job performance and perceived job performance by organizational
level and gender.
11. Agent age and level tenure are increased by one year.
12. The voluntary turnover mechanism is enacted, which consists of
four reasons for voluntarily leaving the organization: reaching
retirement age (as sampled previously), organizational level tenure
exceeding 4 years, probability of leaving after having children, and
leaving at random (set to 4% of the workforce).
13. The involuntary turnover mechanism, adapted from Scullen et al.,
(2005), is enacted in which the lowest 10% of agents in terms of
perceived performance are removed.
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14. The number of external hires is selected based on the proportion of
external hires at each level set initially. An external labor pool is
created based on the number of external hires selected. Individuals
in the external labor pool fill the organization with pre-sampled
individual characteristics (the same mechanism used to initially fill
the organization).
15. The promotion mechanism, in which individuals in the
organization will be ranked and ordered by level and performance
evaluation scores, is enacted. The simulation iterates over each
organizational level and selects the individuals in the
organizational level below that of the current iteration with the
highest performance based on how many remaining vacancies
there are after external hiring is completed.
16. The remaining vacant positions in the lowest level (level 6) of the
organization are filled with external hires.
17. The simulation continues to run through steps 4-16 when the time,
year, is less than the simulation duration initially determined (i.e.,
40 years). When year is greater than the simulation duration, the
simulation will end.
Table 18
Pseudo-code for Computational Model of Organizational Gender Stratification.
Step Action
1
Set model parameters
2
Create organization
3
Fill organization with agents
4
Increment time clock: year = year + 1
5
Assign gender, position, and gender-by-position scores
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6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Compute leadership potential
Enact developmental opportunity seeking and presentation mechanisms
Calculate true performance and perceived performance of agents
Sample individuals taking leave for the year; update perceived
performance scores
Calculate organizational gender stratification and performance
Increase agent age and level tenure
Enact voluntary turnover mechanism
Enact involuntary turnover mechanism
Select number of external hires; fill organization vacancies with external
hires
Enact promotion mechanism
Fill remaining vacant positions in level six with external hires
If year < 40, go to Step 4
If year > 40, end simulation

Figure 1. Simulation Procedure Diagram.

It is worth noting that there are assumptions inherent in computational
modeling. The present model consists of three primary assumptions: 1) model
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parameters were set based on subjective interpretation of previous research; 2) the
sequential nature of sampling procedures used in the simulation create withinperson variability; 3) bias values are static in the model. See Table 19 for a
detailed explanation of the model assumptions.

Table 19
Computational Model Table of Assumptions.
1. Agent ability, leadership ability, age, retirement age, and opportunity seeking are
sampled from normal distributions.
2. There is a 50/50 split of line and staff positions within an organization at all times.
3. Normal job duty performance is sampled from a normal distribution using static bias
points added to an individual agent’s sampling mean.
4. Bias points added to an agent’s sampling distribution mean for performance are static
values based on points awarded for gender and position.
5. Developmental opportunity performance is sampled X times for a given individual,
with X = an agent’s developmental opportunities taken.
6. Perceived job performance is operationalized as the average of an agent’s normal job
duty performance and developmental opportunity performance.
7. True job performance is operationalized as an agent’s true ability, previously sampled.
8 A forced ranking distribution system removes agents with perceived performance
evaluation scores lower than the 10th percentile for a given level.
9. In any given year, agents are sampled to leave voluntarily based on parental leave,
retirement, tenure in level, or at random.

Results
This study utilized two virtual experiments to understand the process of
OGS and examine potential organizational interventions to reduce OGS. The
primary outcomes recorded in the virtual experiments were (1) OGS (i.e., the
proportion of males and females in each organizational level), (2) true
organizational performance (i.e., true ability of agents), and (3) perceived
organizational performance (i.e., perceived ability of agents influenced by biases).
Analyses were conducted in two phases - one for each virtual experiment. A
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hierarchically-structured organization was initialized for each simulation
containing individuals with varying characteristics, including gender, age,
retirement age, ability, and leadership quality, to explore the research propositions
and questions. The first virtual experiment consisted of three conditions (i.e., no
bias, low bias, and high bias) to explore the theoretical space of the OGS model
parameters (i.e., OGS factors), and the second virtual experiment examined the
effectiveness of three bundles of HR initiatives designed to combat factors
leading to OGS (i.e., combating bias, equal opportunities, and evening the playing
field). Each of six simulations had time (T) set to 40 years and ran for 1,000
iterations for a total of 240,000 simulated organizational years. Results were
aggregated across all 1,000 organizations for each of the simulated conditions.
Virtual Experiment 1
The first phase of analyses assessed Propositions I and II, that over time,
(1) OGS will occur most severely in the upper levels of the organization, and (2)
perceived organizational performance will be higher than true organizational
performance in the presence of OGS. The average proportion of males and
females in each level of the organization was examined for each of the simulated
conditions (no bias, low bias, and high bias). Findings revealed that under no bias
(i.e., in a perfectly gender-balanced organization), OGS does not occur in any
organizational level, as depicted by equal proportions of males and females over
time. The proportion of males and females across levels and conditions is
presented in Table 20, and visualized in Figure 2. In years 1, 5, 10, and 15, the
proportions of females in level one (C-Suite) of the organization in the no bias

56

condition were .50, .50, .50, and .49, respectively. In the low bias conditions, over
time, deviations in the proportion of males and females in each level increase such
that males increasingly occupy more positions in all organizational levels, and this
effect is especially pronounced in the upper levels (i.e., levels one through three)
of the organization. In years 1, 5, 10, and 15, the proportions of females in level
one of the organization in the low bias condition were .50, .34, .19, and .15,
respectively. A similar pattern was found for the high bias condition such that the
proportion of males in each level increased over time, especially within the upper
level of the organization. In years 1, 5, 10, and 15, the proportions of females in
level one of the organization in the high bias condition were .50, .28, .08, and .05,
respectively. Across the three conditions (no bias, low bias, high bias), OGS
occurs strongest under high bias (women occupying 5% of C-suite positions),
followed by low bias (women occupying 15% of C-suite positions), and no bias
(women occupying 49% of C-suite positions).
To assess Proposition I, OGS at each organizational level across
conditions was compared. Given OGS did not emerge in the condition without
bias, Proposition I was assessed with respect to the low bias and high bias
condition results. Within both the low bias and high bias conditions, the
proportion of females lessens with each increase in organizational level. Under
low bias for levels one (C-suite) through six (Entry Level), females occupied
15%, 26%, 34%, 38%, 42% and 48% of positions, respectively. Under high bias,
females occupied 5%, 11%, 23%, 30%, 39%, and 48% of positions, respectively.
These results support Proposition I such that over time, OGS occurred most
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severely in the upper levels of the organization. Biases against females have
minimal impact at the Entry Level, and their impact increases with each
organizational level. The biases have the strongest effects in the upper levels of
the organization.

Figure 2. Gender Stratification Across Time and Organizational Level for No
Bias, Low Bias, and High Bias Conditions. Visualizations truncated at 15 year
due to patterns plateauing.

Table 20
Proportion of Males and Females in Organizational Level 1 and 6 for Years 1, 5,
10 and 15 for No Bias, Low Bias, and High Bias.
Organizational
Level
C-suite
(Level 1)

C-suite
(Level 1)

C-suite
(Level 1)

Condition

Gender

1

5

10

15

No Bias

Female

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.49

[.50, .50]

[.17, .83]

[.17, .83]

[.17, .83]

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.51

[.50, .50]

[.17, .83]

[.17, .83]

[.17, .83]

0.50

0.34

0.19

0.15

No Bias

Low Bias

Male

Female
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C-suite
(Level 1)

C-suite
(Level 1)

Low Bias

High Bias

High Bias

Male

Female

Male

C-suite
(Level 1)
Entry Level
(Level 6)

Entry Level
(Level 6)

Entry Level
(Level 6)

Entry Level
(Level 6)

Entry Level
(Level 6)

Entry Level
(Level 6)

No Bias

No Bias

Low Bias

Low Bias

High Bias

High Bias

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

[.50, .50]

[0, .67]

[0, .50]

[0, .50]

0.50

0.66

0.81

0.85

[.50, .50]

[.33, 1]

[.50, 1]

[.50, 1]

0.50

0.28

0.08

0.05

[.50, .50]

[0, .67]

[0, .33]

[0, .33]

0.50

0.72

0.92

0.95

[.50, .50]

[.33, 1]

[.67, 1]

[.67, 1]

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.50

[.50, .50]

[.49, .51]

[.49, .51]

[.49, .51]

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.50

[.50, .50]

[.49, .51]

[.49, .51]

[.49, .51]

0.50

0.48

0.48

0.48

[.50, .50]

[.47, .49]

[.47, .49]

[.47, .49]

0.50

0.52

0.52

0.52

[.50, .50]

[.51, .53]

[.51, .53]

[.51, .53]

0.50

0.47

0.48

0.48

[.50, .50]

[.46, .48]

[.47, .49]

[.47, .49]

0.50

0.53

0.52

0.52

[.50, .50]

[.52, .54]

[.51, .53]

[.51, .53]

Note: values within cells represent the average proportion of individuals (i.e., males or
females) occupying levels 1 or 6 in a given year (i.e., year 1, 5, 10, or 15). Bracketed
values represent confidence intervals for the average proportion of individuals across
1,000 organizational simulations.
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To assess Proposition II, the average perceived and true performance of
males and females in each level of the organization was examined for each of the
simulated conditions. Results from the present study show that under no bias, the
perceived performance of males and females is approximately equal at all levels
across time. To demonstrate this result, the following values represent mean
perceived performance for females and males in levels one (C-suite) through six
(Entry Level) for year 15 under no bias, respectively: F = 128.79, M = 128.83; F
= 128.09, M = 128.13; F = 124.73, M = 124.72; F = 118.45, M = 118.47; F =
109.92, M = 109.92; F = 99.46, M = 99.45. Under low bias, there are deviations in
perceived performance for males and females. The following values represent
mean perceived performance for females and males in levels one through six for
year 15 under low bias, respectively: F = 127.87 M = 130.63; F = 127.75, M =
129.57; F = 124.84, M = 125.90; F = 118.68, M = 119.50; F = 110.14, M =
110.95; F = 99.57, M = 100.72. These values show that not only are males
perceived to be performing at higher levels than females, but these biased
perceptions grow stronger with each organizational level. High bias results show a
similar, yet stronger pattern such that the perceived performance for females and
males in levels one through six for year 15 under high bias are as follows: F =
127.21, M = 131.14; F = 127.33, M = 130.19; F = 124.79, M = 126.40; F =
118.62, M = 119.86; F = 109.95, M = 111.24; F = 99.21, M = 101.06. Again,
these values show that men are perceived to be performing at a higher level than
females throughout the organization, and the differences are larger with each
increasing organizational level (see Table 21 for a summary of perceived
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performance means in year 15 for males and females, and Figure 3 for a
visualization of gender differences in perceived performance over time). Overall,
when either low or high bias is present in an organization, males are perceived to
be performing at a higher level than females throughout the organization.
Results from the present study also show that under no bias, the true
performance of males and females is approximately equal at all levels across time.
To demonstrate this result, the following values represent mean true performance
for males and females in levels one (C-suite) through six (Entry Level) for year
15, respectively: F = 127.78, M = 127.82; F = 127.10, M = 127.10; F = 123.73, M
= 123.74; F = 117.45, M = 117.47; F = 108.92, M = 108.92; F = 98.46, M =
98.45. Under low bias, there are slight deviations in true performance for females
and males in levels one through six for year 15: F = 127.49, M = 127.76; F =
127.23, M = 126.77; F = 124.31, M = 123.10; F = 118.13, M = 116.70; F =
109.60, M = 108.14; F = 99.02, M = 97.91. Under low bias, in all levels excluding
level one (C-suite), the true performance of females exceeds the true performance
of males, which is in direct opposition of perceived performance results. Under
high bias, there are similar deviations in true performance for females and males
in levels one through six for year 15: F = 126.88, M = 127.70; F = 127.49, M =
126.72; F = 124.88, M = 122.93; F = 118.69, M = 116.39; F = 110.01, M =
107.77; F = 99.24, M = 97.62. Under high bias, in all levels excluding level one
(C-suite), the true performance of females exceeds the true performance of males,
which is also in direct opposition of perceived performance results (see Table 21
for a summary of true performance means in year 15 for males and females, and
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Figure 4 for a visualization of gender differences in true performance over time).
Overall, within the low bias and high bias conditions, females had higher true
performance compared to males throughout the organization, excluding in the Csuite.
Table 21
Average True Performance and Perceived Performance Across Levels in Year 15
for Low Bias and High Bias Conditions.
Low Bias

Org Level

Gender

C-suite
(Level 1)

Female

C-suite
(Level 1)

SVP
(Level 2)

SVP
(Level 2)

VP
(Level 3)

VP
(Level 3)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

True
Perceived
Performance Performa
Mean
nce Mean

High Bias
True
Performance
Mean

Perceived
Performance
Mean

127.49

127.87

126.88

127.21

[117.17,
129.95]

[115.88,
135]

[112.99,
129.94]

[109.05,
134.99]

127.76

130.63

127.70

131.14

[124.58,
129.31]

[126.47,
133.75]

[124.71,
129.30]

[127.54,
134]

127.23

127.75

127.49

127.33

[124.56,
128.76]

[124.17,
130.82]

[122.65,
129.40]

[120.87,
132.52]

126.77

129.57

126.72

130.19

[125.28,
127.73]

[127.96,
131.01]

[125.60,
127.67]

[128.82,
131.66]

124.31

124.84

124.88

124.79

[123.45,
125.15]

[123.73,
126]

[123.93,
125.77]

[123.59,
127.19]

123.10

125.90

122.93

126.40
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Senior
Manager
(Level 4)

Senior
Manager
(Level 4)

Manager
(Level 5)

Manager
(Level 5)

Entry Level
(Level 6)

Entry Level
(Level 6)

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

[122.43,
123.76]

[125.07,
126.69]

[122.23,
123.60]

[125.59,
127.19]

118.13

118.68

118.69

118.62

[117.64,
118.67]

[118.05,
119.34]

[118.19,
119.23]

[117.90,
119.33]

116.70

119.50

116.39

119.86

[116.26,
117.12]

[119,
120.01]

[115.97,
116.81]

[119.38,
120.34]

109.60

110.14

110.01

109.95

[109.32,
109.87]

[109.81,
110.48]

[109.74,
110.32]

[109.58,
110.34]

108.14

110.95

107.77

111.24

[108.88,
108.41]

[110.67,
111.22]

[107.53,
108.05]

[110.96,
115.54]

99.02

99.57

99.24

99.21

[98.76,
99.30]

[99.27,
99.88]

[98.99,
99.49]

[98.91,
99.49]

97.91

100.72

97.62

101.06

[97.67,
98.17]

[100.46,
100.98]

[97.37,
97.88]

[100.80,
101.34]

Note: values within cells represent the average performance of individuals (i.e., males or
females) occupying levels 1 or 6 in a given year (i.e., year 1, 5, 10, or 15). Bracketed
values represent confidence intervals for the average performance of individuals across
1,000 organizational simulations. Org = organizational.
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Figure 3. Perceived Performance Across Time and Organizational Level for No
Bias, Low Bias, and High Bias Conditions.

Figure 4. True Performance Across Time and Organizational Level for No Bias,
Low Bias, and High Bias Conditions.

These results provide support for Proposition II such that perceived
organizational performance was higher than true organizational performance in
the presence of OGS at all levels across gender. Across all three conditions,
differences between true and perceived performance are strongest when high bias
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is present, followed by low bias, and no bias (see Table 22 for exact values). In
the no bias condition, mean differences for true and perceived performance across
gender by level (one through six) are as follows: Mdifference = 1.01, Mdifference = 1.01,
Mdifference = 1.00, Mdifference = 1.00, Mdifference = 1.00, Mdifference = 1.00, and Mdifference =
1.00, all favoring perceived performance. In the low bias condition, mean
differences for true and perceived performance across gender by level (one
through six) are as follows: Mdifference = 1.91, Mdifference = 1.66, Mdifference = 1.67,
Mdifference = 1.67, Mdifference = 1.68, and Mdifference = 1.68, favoring perceived
performance. In the high bias condition, mean differences for true and perceived
performance across gender by level (one through six) are as follows: Mdifference =
2.82, Mdifference = 1.67, Mdifference = 1.69, Mdifference = 1.70, Mdifference = 1.70, and
Mdifference = 1.71, favoring perceived performance. The difference between true and
perceived performance is strongest in level one (the C-suite) of an organization
across all three conditions. When averaging across gender and organizational
levels, the overall differences in performance between true and perceived
organizational performance were Mdifference = 1.00, Mdifference = 1.66, and Mdifference =
1.72 favoring perceived performance under no bias, low bias, and high bias,
respectively (shown in Table 23). Overall, these results show that organizational
workforce potential is maximized under no bias and reduced under low and high
bias. In other words, when OGS is minimized, the true performance of individuals
more closely resembles the perceived performance of the same individuals, which
enhances organizational workforce potential.
Table 22
True and Perceived Performance Across Levels by Condition for Year 15.
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Condition
No Bias

Low Bias

High Bias

True
Performance
Mean

Perceived
Performance
Mean

Difference

C-suite
(Level 1)

127.80

128.81

1.01

SVP
(Level 2)

127.10

128.11

1.01

VP
(Level 3)

123.73

124.73

1.00

Senior Manager
(Level 4)

117.46

118.46

1.00

Manager
(Level 5)

108.92

109.92

1.00

Entry Level
(Level 6)

98.46

99.46

1.00

C-suite
(Level 1)

127.65

129.56

1.91

SVP
(Level 2)

127.00

128.66

1.66

VP
(Level 3)

123.70

125.37

1.67

Senior Manager
(Level 4)

117.42

119.09

1.67

Manager
(Level 5)

108.87

110.54

1.68

Entry Level
(Level 6)

98.46

100.14

1.68

C-suite
(Level 1)

127.53

130.35

2.82

SVP
(Level 2)

127.10

128.77

1.67

Organizational
Level
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VP
(Level 3)

123.91

125.59

1.69

Senior Manager
(Level 4)

117.54

119.24

1.70

Manager
(Level 5)

108.89

110.60

1.70

Entry Level
(Level 6)

98.43

100.14

1.71

Table 23
Average True, and Perceived Organizational Performance for No Bias, Low Bias,
and High Bias in Year 15.
Condition

Overall True
Organizational
Performance

Overall
Perceived
Organizational
Performance

Overall Difference
Between True and
Perceived Organizational
Performance

No Bias

117.25

118.25

1.00

Low Bias

117.18

118.84

1.66

High Bias

117.19

118.92

1.72

It is worth noting that in the C-suite of the organizations within each
simulated condition, true performance of females did not exceed true performance
of males. There are two explanations for this unexpected pattern. Both
explanations are rooted in the sampling procedures used in the present model. The
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first explanation relates to external hiring processes: the C-suite of all simulated
organizations in the present model consists of six employees. When a position in
the C-suite is vacant, a probability of external hire is sampled. If that sampled
probability favors external hiring, then a new agent is created with a sampled
gender and true performance ability. The true performance ability of agents in the
C-suite was drawn from a normal distribution with M = 100, SD = 15 (see
Methods for more details). It is probable that during a number of simulation runs,
a female agent was created with sub-average ability, compared to the average
ability in the C-suite, and placed into the C-suite. Due to the low number of
females present in the C-suite (i.e., typically only one out of six), it is possible
that the sampled external hire of a female with sub-average ability into the C-suite
occurred within the simulations to bring down the average of female true ability
within an organization. The second explanation relates to the calculation of
perceived performance in the organization. Perceived performance is the average
of an agent’s sampled normal job duty performance and developmental
opportunity performance, both of which are sampled based on a) an agent’s true
ability and b) incorporated biases depending on the condition (see Methods for a
detailed explanation). Perceived performance of agents fluctuates year to year
due: 1) the variance inherent in sampling procedures; 2) the number of
developmental opportunities an agent takes; 3) being in a line or staff position; 4)
gender. It is possible that during this sampling, females receive higher perceived
performance evaluations than their true performance as a result of these reasons,
which allows perceived performance to be higher than true performance in one
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year and lower than true performance in another year, allowing lower-ability
agents to be promoted into the C-suite.
Virtual Experiment 2
The second phase of analysis assessed Research Questions (RQs) I-III:
how and to what extent is OGS reduced and organizational workforce potential
increased as a result of (I) reducing biases in selection and performance appraisal,
(II) providing equal developmental opportunities to males and females and
providing improved parental leave policies to employees, and (III) placing more
women in line positions compared to staff positions. The baseline conditions used
for VE2 were the low bias condition parameters set in VE1 since the results of
VE1 most closely resembled what is seen in organizations today (i.e.,
approximately 80% males occupying upper level leadership positions; Women in
the Workplace, 2017).
The three HR bundles were evaluated in relation to OGS, perceived
performance, and true performance (i.e., same outcomes measured in VE1). In
examining the effectiveness of the HR bundles in reducing OGS, results show that
Bundle 1 (removing bias in selection and performance appraisal) is the most
effective at reducing OGS compared to Bundles 2 and 3. The proportion of
females in organizational levels one (C-suite) through six (Entry Level) under
Bundle 1 in year 15 were 0.46, 0.46, 0.46, 0.47, 0.47, and 0.48, respectively (for
reference, under no bias in VE1, the proportion of females in the C-suite after 15
years was 0.49). The proportion of females in organizational levels one through
six under Bundle 2 (equalizing developmental opportunities and providing
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improved parental leave) were 0.16, 0.27, 0.36, 0.40, 0.44, and 0.49, respectively.
For Bundle 3 (equalizing the proportion of males and females in line positions),
the proportion of females occupying levels one through six were 0.16, 0.26, 0.34,
0.38, 0.42, and 0.48, respectively, for Bundle 3. Table 24 shows the proportion of
males and females across organizational level in year 15 for Bundles 1, 2, and 3.
Overall, Bundle 1 was more effective at reducing OGS than both Bundle 2 and
Bundle 3 (see Figure 5 for a visualization of the emergence of OGS over time
across the three bundles).
Table 24
Proportion of Males and Females Across Organizational Level in Year 15 for
Bundles 1, 2, and 3.
Bundle 1
Organizational
Level
C-suite
(Level 1)

C-suite
(Level 1)

SVP
(Level 2)

SVP
(Level 2)

Gender
Female

Male

Female

Male

Bundle 2

Bundle 3

Proportion
0.46

0.16

0.16

[.17, .83]

[0, .50]

[0, .50]

0.54

0.84

0.84

[.17, .83]

[.50, 1]

[.50, 1]

0.46

0.27

0.26

[.31, .64]

[.14, .42]

[.14, .42]

0.54

0.73

0.74

[.36, .69]

[.58, .86]

[.58, .86]
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VP
(Level 3)

VP
(Level 3)

Senior Manager
(Level 4)

Senior Manager
(Level 4)

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

0.46

0.36

0.34

[.40, .53]

[.31, .43]

[.28, .41]

0.54

0.64

0.66

[.47, .60]

[.57, .69]

[.59, .72]

0.47

0.40

0.38

[.43, .50]

[.37, .43]

[.35, .41]

0.53

0.60

0.62

[.50, .57]

[.57, .63]

[.59, .65]

0.47

0.44

0.42

[.46, .49]

[.42, .45]

[.40, .44]

0.53

0.56

0.58

[.51, .54]

[.55, .58]

[.56, .60]

0.48

0.49

0.48

[.47, .49]

[.48, .50]

[.47, .49]

0.52

0.51

0.52

[.51., .53]

[.50, .52]

[.51, .53]

Manager
(Level 5)

Manager
(Level 5)

Entry Level
(Level 6)

Entry Level
(Level 6)

Male

Female

Male
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Note: values within cells represent the average proportion of individuals (i.e., males or
females) occupying levels 1 or 6 in year 15. Bracketed values represent confidence
intervals for the average proportion of individuals across 1,000 organizational
simulations.

Figure 5. Gender Stratification Across Time and Organizational Level for Bundles 1, 2
and 3.

To evaluate changes in workforce potential across the HR bundles, the
average perceived and true performance of males and females in each level of the
organization was examined for each of the simulated conditions. Bundle 1 results
show minimal differences in perceived performance of males and females at all
levels. To demonstrate this result, the following values represent mean perceived
performance for females and males in levels one (C-suite) through six (Entry
Level) for year 15 in Bundle 1, respectively: F = 128.87, M = 128.87; F = 128.00,
M = 128.08; F = 124.67, M = 124.72; F = 118.40, M = 118.43; F = 109.89, M =
109.86; F = 99.47, M = 99.41. Males and females are perceived to be performing
at approximately the same rates when bias in performance appraisal evaluation
and hiring practices is removed. Bundle 2 does not eliminate differences in
perceived performance of males and females. To show this result, the following
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values represent mean perceived performance for females and males in levels one
through six for year 15 in Bundle 2, respectively: F = 127.98, M = 130.59; F =
127.90, M = 129.59; F = 124.96, M = 125.93; F = 118.86, M = 119.54; F =
110.28, M = 110.99; F = 99.64, M = 100.76. Males are still perceived to be
outperforming females at all organizational levels. Bundle 3 also does not
eliminate differences in perceived performance of males and females. To show
this result, the following values represent mean perceived performance for males
and females in levels one through six for year 15 in Bundle 3, respectively: F =
127.92, M = 130.49; F = 127.76, M = 129.59; F = 124.84, M = 125.89; F =
118.67, M = 119.94; F = 110.14, M = 110.94; F = 99.55, M = 100.71. In this
case, males are also perceived to be outperforming females in all organizational
levels (see Table 25a, 25b, and 25c for a summary of perceived performance in
year 15 for males and females across organizational levels for Bundles 1, 2, and 3,
respectively). Overall, Bundle 1 best reduced the discrepancy between male and
female perceived performance over time (see Figure 6 for a visualization of
differences in perceived male and female performance over time by
organizational level).
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Figure 6. Perceived Performance Across Time and Organizational Level for
Bundles 1, 2 and 3.

The average true performance of males and females in each level of the
organization was also examined for each of the simulated conditions. Bundle 1
results again show minimal difference in true performance of males and females
from levels one through six. To demonstrate this result, the following values
represent mean true performance for females and males in levels one (C-suite)
through six (Entry Level) for year 15 in Bundle 1, respectively: F = 127.83 M =
127.86; F = 127.00, M = 127.11; F = 123.68, M = 123.72; F = 117.40, M =
117.43; F = 108.89, M = 108.86; F = 98.47, M = 98.41. Males and females truly
performed at approximately the same rates when bias in performance appraisal
evaluation and hiring practices is removed. Bundle 2 results show slight
differences in true performance of males and females. The following values
represent mean true performance for females and males in levels one through six
for year 15 in Bundle 2, respectively: F = 127.64, M = 127.76; F = 127.29, M =
126.78; F = 124.42, M = 123.11; F = 118.29, M = 116.74; F = 109.73, M =
108.18; F = 99.09, M = 97.95. Similar to results from VE1, female true
performance exceeds that of males, excluding at the C-suite level, even though
males occupy more higher-level positions. Bundle 3 also shows slight differences
in true performance of males and females. To show this result, the following
values represent mean true performance for males and females in levels one
through six for year 15 in Bundle 3, respectively: F = 127.38, M = 127.73; F =
127.24, M = 126.78; F = 124.28, M = 123.08; F = 118.13, M = 116.69; F =
109.59, M = 108.13; F = 99.00, M = 97.90. In this case, females are also
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outperforming males in all organizational levels, excluding in the C-suite level
(see Table 23a, 23b, and 23c for a summary of true performance in year 15 for
males and females across organizational levels for Bundles 1, 2, and 3,
respectively). Overall, Bundle 1 best reduced the discrepancy between male and
female true performance over time such that males and females occupying each
organizational level have similar true ability levels, whereas under Bundles 2 and
3, women have higher ability levels at each organizational level, excluding the Csuite, compared to males (see Figure 7 for a visualization of differences in true
male and female performance over time by organizational level).
Table 25a
Average True and Perceived Performance of Males and Females Across
Organizational Levels in Year 15 for Bundle 1.
Condition

Organizational
Level

Gender

Average True
Performance

Average Perceived
Performance

Bundle 1

C-suite
(Level 1)

Female

127.83

128.87

[122.16, 129.70]

[122.14, 133.61]

127.86

128.87

[122.34, 129.66]

[122.92, 133.02]

127.00

128.00

[125.37, 128.23]

[125.88, 130.01]

127.11

128.08

[125.57, 128.16]

[126.36, 129.64]

Bundle 1

Bundle 1

Bundle 1

C-suite
(Level 1)

SVP
(Level 2)

SVP
(Level 2)

Male

Female

Male
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Bundle 1

Bundle 1

Bundle 1

Bundle 1

Bundle 1

Bundle 1

Bundle 1

Bundle 1

VP
(Level 3)

VP
(Level 3)

Senior
Manager
(Level 4)

Senior
Manager
(Level 4)

Manager
(Level 5)

Manager
(Level 5)

Entry Level
(Level 6)

Entry Level
(Level 6)

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

123.68

124.67

[122.88, 124.39]

[123.77,. 125.58]

123.72

124.72

[122.98, 124.42]

[123.91, 125.50]

117.40

118.40

[116.95.117.87]

[117.99, 118.94]

117.43

118.43

[116.97, 117.88]

[117.94, 118.93]

108.89

109.89

[108.60.109.16]

[109.59, 110.20]

108.86

109.86

[108.59, 109.12]

[109.58, 110.14]

98.47

99.47

[98.21, 98.72]

[99.19, 99.73]

98.41

99.41

[98.16, 98.65]

[99.14, 99.67]

Note: values within cells represent the average performance of individuals (i.e., males or
females) occupying levels 1 or 6 in year 15. Bracketed values represent confidence
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intervals for the average performance of individuals across 1,000 organizational
simulations.

Table 25b
Average True and Perceived Performance of Males and Females Across
Organizational Levels in Year 15 for Bundle 2.
Condition

Bundle 2

Bundle 2

Bundle 2

Bundle 2

Bundle 2

Bundle 2

Bundle 2

Organizational
Level

Gender

Average True
Performance

Average Perceived
Performance

C-suite
(Level 1)

Female

127.64

127.98

[119.36, 129.94]

[119.20, 134.43]

127.76

130.59

[124.52, 129.36]

[126.91, 133.95]

127.29

127.90

[124.78, 128.82]

[124.64, 130.74]

126.78

129.59

[125.50, 127.73]

[127.99, 131.09]

124.42

124.96

[123.66, 125.14]

[123.90, 126.03]

123.11

125.93

[122.49, 123.74]

[125.10, 126.72]

118.29

118.86

C-suite
(Level 1)

SVP
(Level 2)

SVP
(Level 2)

VP
(Level 3)

VP
(Level 3)

Senior
Manager
(Level 4)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female
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Bundle 2

Bundle 2

Bundle 2

Bundle 2

Bundle 2

Senior
Manager
(Level 4)

Manager
(Level 5)

Manager
(Level 5)

Entry Level
(Level 6)

Entry Level
(Level 6)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

[117.81, 118.79]

[118.23, 119.45]

116.74

119.54

[116.34, 117.15]

[119.07, 125.05]

109.73

110.28

[109.44, 110.03]

[109.93, 110.59]

108.18

110.99

[107.92, 108.43]

[110.68, 111.27]

99.09

99.64

[98.81, 99.35]

[99.33, 99.94]

97.95

100.76

[97.70, 98.20]

[100.49, 101.03]

Note: values within cells represent the average performance of individuals (i.e., males or
females) occupying levels 1 or 6 in year 15. Bracketed values represent confidence
intervals for the average performance of individuals across 1,000 organizational
simulations.

Table 25c
Average True and Perceived Performance of Males and Females Across
Organizational Levels in Year 15 for Bundle 3.
Condition
Bundle 3

Organizational
Level
C-suite
(Level 1)

Gender

Average True
Performance

Average Perceived
Performance

Female

127.38

127.92

[114.83, 129.93]

[115.28, 134.88]
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Bundle 3

Bundle 3

Bundle 3

Bundle 3

Bundle 3

Bundle 3

Bundle 3

Bundle 3

Bundle 3

C-suite
(Level 1)

SVP
(Level 2)

SVP
(Level 2)

VP
(Level 3)

VP
(Level 3)

Senior
Manager
(Level 4)

Senior
Manager
(Level 4)

Manager
(Level 5)

Manager
(Level 5)

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

127.73

130.49

[124.34, 129.32]

[126.19, 133.68]

127.24

127.76

[124.52, 128.84]

[124.43, 130.68]

126.78

129.59

[125.50, 127.75]

[128.09, 131.05]

124.28

124.84

[123.44, 125.10]

[123.71, 126.01]

123.08

125.89

[122.39, 123.76]

[125.15, 126.72]

118.13

118.67

[117.61, 118.62]

[118.04, 119.27]

116.69

119.49

[116.30, 117.10]

[119.02, 119.98]

109.59

110.14

[109.30, 109.87]

[109.80, 110.46]

108.13

110.94
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Bundle 3

Bundle 3

Entry Level
(Level 6)

Entry Level
(Level 6)

Female

Male

[107.85, 108.39]

[110.64, 111.22]

99.00

99.55

[98.75, 99.26]

[99.27, 99.83]

97.90

100.71

[97.64, 98.16]

[100.45, 100.99]

Note: values within cells represent the average performance of individuals (i.e., males or
females) occupying levels 1 or 6 in year 15. Bracketed values represent confidence
intervals for the average performance of individuals across 1,000 organizational
simulations.

Figure 7. True Performance Across Time and Organizational Level for Bundles
1, 2 and 3.

Across all three conditions, differences between true and perceived
performance are best minimized under Bundle 1 (reducing bias in performance
evaluation and selection), followed by Bundle 3 (placing equal proportions of
males and females in line positions), and Bundle 2 (providing equal
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developmental opportunities and improving parental leave policies). Under
Bundle 1, mean differences for true and perceived performance across gender by
level (one through six) are as follows: M = 1.02, M = 0.99, M = 1.00, M = 1.00, M
= 1.00, M = 1.00, and M = 1.00. Under Bundle 3 mean differences for true and
perceived performance across gender by level (one through six) are as follows: M
= 1.90, M = 1.67, M = 1.68, M = 1.67, M = 1.68, and M = 1.68. Under Bundle 2,
mean differences for true and perceived performance across gender by level (one
through six) are as follows: M = 1.95, 1.70, 1.68, 1.68, 1.68, and 1.68 (see Table
26 for values). The difference between true and perceived performance remains
strongest in level one (C-suite) of an organization across all three conditions.
When averaging across gender and organizational levels, the overall differences
in performance between true and perceived organizational performance was M =
1.00, M = 1.69, and M = 1.67 under Bundle 1, Bundle 3, and Bundle 2,
respectively (shown in Table 27). Overall, these results show that organizational
workforce potential is maximized under Bundle 1, followed by Bundle 3, and
Bundle 2. In other words, when bias in performance evaluation and selections is
removed, the true performance of individuals more closely resembles the
perceived performance of the same individuals, which enhances organizational
workforce potential. However, improving developmental opportunities, parental
leave policies, and female representation in line positions does not maximize
organizational workforce potential as much as removing biases in performance
evaluation and selection.
Table 26
True and Perceived Performance Across Levels by Condition for Year 15.
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Condition

Organizational
Level

True
Performance
Mean

Perceived
Performance
Mean

Difference

Bundle 1

C-suite
(Level 1)

127.85

128.87

1.02

SVP
(Level 2)

127.05

128.04

0.99

VP
(Level 3)

123.70

124.70

1.00

Senior Manager
(Level 4)

117.42

118.42

1.00

Manager
(Level 5)

108.87

109.87

1.00

Entry Level
(Level 6)

98.44

99.44

1.00

C-suite
(Level 1)

127.62

129.57

1.95

SVP
(Level 2)

126.98

128.68

1.70

VP
(Level 3)

123.71

125.39

1.68

Senior Manager
(Level 4)

117.43

119.11

1.68

Manager
(Level 5)

108.87

110.55

1.68

Entry Level
(Level 6)

98.46

100.14

1.68

C-suite
(Level 1)

127.60

129.49

1.90

SVP
(Level 2)

127.01

128.68

1.67

Bundle 2

Bundle 3
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VP
(Level 3)

123.68

125.36

1.68

Senior Manager
(Level 4)

117.41

119.08

1.67

Manager
(Level 5)

108.86

110.54

1.68

Entry Level
(Level 6)

98.45

100.13

1.68

Table 27
Average true, and perceived organizational performance for Bundles 1, 2, and 3
in year 15.
Condition

Overall True
Organizational
Performance

Overall Perceived
Organizational
Performance

Overall Difference Between
True and Perceived
Organizational Performance

Bundle 1

117.22

118.22

1.00

Bundle 2

117.17

118.86

1.69

Bundle 3

117.16

118.83

1.67

There are two explanations for why Bundle 1 reduced OGS and the
discrepancy between true and perceived performance of males and females, while
Bundles 2 and 3 did not. The first explanation is that bias in performance
evaluation and selection are the strongest contributors to OGS compared to the
remaining three factors (i.e., career decisions, familial effects, and differences in
developmental opportunities). The present model calculated true and perceived
performance evaluations of agents. True performance of agents was equal to an
agent’s true ability sampled upon entrance to the organization. Perceived
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performance was calculated based on two factors: 1) sampled normal job duty
performance, and 2) sampled developmental opportunity performance. Biases in
developmental opportunities occur when sampling developmental opportunity
performance by giving lower values to the performance opportunities of females,
thus decreasing the number of “opportunities to perform” their developmental
opportunities. Developmental opportunity performance is then sampled based on
the number of opportunities agents receive. If agents receive fewer developmental
opportunities, then they have more variation around their mean performance
which impacts their overall developmental opportunity performance. Performance
on normal job duties includes added bias points to the mean of the sampling
distribution used, which more strongly impacts the samples by increasing the
mean. Taken together, adding bias points to the sampling mean more strongly
influences how perceived performance was calculated in the present model
relative to other mechanisms.
The second explanation is developmental opportunities in the current
model contribute to perceived performance via sampling from an agent’s task
ability the number of times that an agent decides to take developmental
opportunities. This means that the more developmental opportunities an agent
receives, the less variability there will be around his or her average developmental
opportunity performance. However, this does not contribute to overall
performance evaluation as directly as biases in performance evaluation do
because this does not add to an agent’s mean true ability. Additionally, reducing
the number of females turning over as a result of taking parental leave does not
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directly impact performance evaluations, thus making it a weaker contributor to
overall organizational workforce potential. The mechanism for parental leave
involves sampling a set proportion of individuals which impacts the performance
evaluations of the individuals (i.e., reduces evaluations for females, increases
evaluations for males). These individuals are then sampled to turnover as a result
of taking leave. However, only a small number of individuals are impacted by this
mechanism, which explains why the mechanism did not strongly impact results.
Finally, placing an equal number of males and females in line positions did not
reduce OGS. The present model favors those in line positions, and especially
favors when males are in line positions. The mechanism for placing more females
in line positions was static such that an equal number of males and females were
in line positions initially within an organization. However, over time, the bias
against females accumulated to overpower the effects of placing more females in
line positions.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine how five factors related to OGS
interactively impact the proportion of men and women across organizational
levels, and how organizational gender diversity, in turn, impacts organizational
workforce potential. Research shows that women face barriers to career
advancement at all levels within organizations (Baxter & Wright, 2000; Elliott &
Smith, 2004; Eagly, 2007). This examination considered the emergence and
interaction of both top-down (i.e., selection, performance appraisal, and
developmental opportunities) and bottom-up processes (career and familial

85

effects) impacting OGS and organizational workforce potential. Organizations
can take steps to reduce OGS by targeting the factors that produce OGS. This
study utilized computational modeling to (1) examine the emergence of OGS as a
function of interacting individual and organizational processes and (2) how
human resources initiatives might mitigate OGS while improving workforce
potential.
Results from the first virtual experiment show that under no bias in
selection, performance appraisal, developmental opportunities, career choices,
and familial effects, OGS does not emerge, and discrepancies between true
performance and perceived performance of men and women are minimal.
Although intuitive, these results serve as a baseline for studying OGS. However,
even when there are small biases against women, there are large discrepancies in
the proportion of men and women throughout an organization, and this is
especially pronounced with each higher organizational level. On average, when
there is low bias against women, men are perceived to perform better in their jobs.
Yet, results show that if organizations capture true performance, they would find
women outperform men across organizational levels, excluding in the C-suite. It
is important to note that the primary route to top leadership positions is based on
performance perceptions in the current study, and the discrepancies in true versus
perceived performance of men and women has direct implications for
promotability. In other words, women are typically evaluated differently than men
(Foschi 1992; 1996, 2000; Mengel et al., 2017), which, in turn, impacts the
proportion of women in each organizational level over time such that men are
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perceived to be performing better than women, and thus, men are primarily being
promoted into higher organizational levels. The organization is not promoting its
top talent which impacts the workforce potential of an organization (i.e., human
capital resources; Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011). A similar pattern of results
emerged when large biases against women were present such that men were
perceived to be performing better than women when, in reality, women were more
capable than men in each level, excluding the C-suite. The primary difference
between the effects of low bias and high bias in creating OGS is that under high
bias, OGS occurs more rapidly than under low bias due to stronger deviations in
perceived and true performance of men and women. Overall, OGS and the
discrepancy between true and perceived performance are best minimized when
bias is not present, thus resulting in higher organizational workforce potential.
Results from the second virtual experiment show how various HR
initiatives differentially impact OGS and organizational workforce potential.
Removing bias in performance evaluation and selection practices minimizes OGS,
almost reducing it entirely. These results are due to equal performance
perceptions of men and women. When women are viewed as performing as well
as men, they are viewed as equally eligible for promotion, and thus, reducing
OGS. Additionally, the discrepancy between true and perceived organizational
performance are best minimized when removing bias in performance evaluation
and selection, thus allowing organizations to promote their top talent, irrespective
of gender. These results are not surprising considering the direct link between
perceived performance and promotions within the model used in this study. In
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other words, if individuals are promoted based on their perceived performance,
and women face biases when their performance is evaluated, then biases women
face translate into a disadvantage with respect to perceived promotability. When
removing biases in developmental opportunities between men and women, and
improving parental leave policies, OGS was surprisingly not mitigated. Results
showed that OGS still occurs due to differences in how men and women are
perceived to be performing. The same result is shown with equalizing the number
of men and women in line and staff positions such that the career choices made by
individuals does not reduce OGS. One explanation for these results is that the
direct link between biases in evaluating performance and making promotion
decisions is stronger than the more subtle mechanisms stemming from the other
factors (i.e., developmental opportunities, paternity leave, line position
experience). In other words, even if organizations are able to even the playing
field in terms of providing women with managerial experience in line positions,
provide equal developmental opportunities to men and women, and create
parental leave policies that welcome women back into the organization, failing to
remove bias in evaluation as a barrier will continue to reinforce OGS, thus
impacting organizational workforce potential.
Overall, this study demonstrates the importance of examining interactive
factors contributing to OGS. When there is low or high bias present in
performance evaluations, selection, developmental opportunities, familial effects,
and career decisions, OGS emerges relatively quickly. Additionally, for
organizations seeking to reduce OGS and improve organizational workforce
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potential, the present study finds bias in performance evaluation and selection to
be the strongest contributors (of the five factors examined) to OGS and decreased
organizational workforce potential. Thus, without reducing bias in performance
evaluation and selection, focusing HR initiatives on the other three factors (i.e.,
developmental opportunities, familial effects, and career decisions) will not yield
much value.
Implications for Theory and Practice
The present study has implications for both theory and practice. The
computational nature of this study provides a theoretical exploration of factors
relating to OGS and provides practical insights for organizations seeking to
reduce OGS and improve organizational workforce potential. Below I provide
three key theoretical implications, and three practical implications of the present
study.
Theoretical Implications. There are three key theoretical implications of
the present study. First, studying OGS requires an understanding of factors that
impact OGS. Results of the present study reveal that OGS emerges relatively
quickly when there is low and high bias, and that OGS occurs more severely with
each increase in organizational level. This sheds light on the bottom-up nature of
OGS such that it is an accumulation of effects from biases over time (Martell et
al., 2012), confirming that OGS is a dynamic process that warrants longitudinal
examination as year to year, small differences in promotions eventually manifest
into substantial OGS over time.
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Second, the present study built on past examinations of OGS by
additionally considering the relationship between OGS and organizational
workforce potential. Previous computational models of OGS have not considered
the implications of examining true versus perceived performance evaluations, or
linked OGS to organizational outcomes (Martell et al., 2012; Samuelson et al.,
2018). Bias against women in the present study results in discrepancies between
true and perceived performance, which holds implications for who is promoted
within organizations. If organizations do not have a clear picture of who is best
suited for advancement, then an organization suffers in their organizational
workforce potential. The link between OGS and organizational workforce
potential is crucial to study as it represents how OGS translates to
organizationally meaningful outcomes. As such, the present study provides a
theoretical examination of the organizational implications of OGS.
Third, this study demonstrates how various HR interventions impact OGS
and workforce potential. Results from the present study suggest reducing biases in
performance evaluation and selection best reduce OGS and improve workforce
potential. Previous research finds a standardized interview process (Williamson et
al., 1997) and multiple interview scales with detailed anchor ratings (Campison et
al., 1997) enhances reliability of the selection process. Research also finds frame
of reference training (Hauenstein, 1998), structured free recall, source monitoring,
and error management training (Anderson et al., 2015) reduces biases in
performance evaluations. The present study suggests better understanding the
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application and effectiveness of these HR interventions is warranted to reduce
OGS and improve workforce potential.
Practical Implications. This study also has multiple practical
implications. First, this study provides practitioners with novel information
regarding the impact of OGS in organizations on organizational workforce
potential. Key organizational stakeholders are typically concerned with the
bottom-line in their organizations, and this concern does not change with
heightened awareness of biases against women within organizations (Women in
the Workplace, 2017). Previous research finds a return-on-investment for
increasing gender diversity in organizations such that gender-diverse
organizations are more likely to bring in top talent, appeal to customers (Hunt et
al., 2015) and have increased financial returns (Hoobler et al., 2016). The present
study shows how these results emerge, which is due to a decreased discrepancy
between how performance of men and women is perceived, thus allowing
organizations to select and promote top talent.
Second, this study serves as an intervention tool for practitioners wishing
to improve their organizational workforce potential by reducing OGS. Ideally,
organizations would enact HR initiatives that combat all fives factors impacting
OGS, which the present study demonstrates is most effective in mitigating OGS
and improving organizational workforce potential. However, in reality,
organizations have to decide which resources to allocate to HR initiatives. The
present study recommends focusing efforts on examining and reducing biases in
performance evaluation and selection practices will yield the most impact on OGS
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and organizational workforce potential. To do this, organization can train
employees to reduce bias in performance evaluations by conducting frame of
reference training, structured free recall, source monitoring, and error
management training (Anderson et al., 2015; Hauenstein, 1998). Organizations
can additionally conduct interviews in a standardized manner and use multiple
interviewers (Campion et al., 1997; Williamson et al., 1997).
Lastly, this study shows the value of studying both individual and
organizational processes within organizations. Computational modeling is an
approach that can be applied to a number of organizational issues (e.g., team
cognition; Grand et al., 2016; turnover; Scullen et al., 2005), and it offers a costeffective method of evaluating the nature of interactive processes and the
potential impact of organizational interventions. Stakeholders that seek to
understand how OGS unfolds and impacts workforce potential within their
organizations can utilize the present model. The present model can be altered to
match the organizational context under investigation to 1) provide an explanation
for the current gender composition of an organization, and 2) serve as an
intervention-evaluation tool to decide which set of interventions would yield the
highest return-on-investment for reducing OGS and improving organizational
workforce potential.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, computational modeling is a
theoretical research tool that does not involve the collection of data; thus, it is not
necessarily representative of reality. The external validity of a computational
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model depends on how closely a model reflects empirical patterns. The present
study used model parameters informed by the literature to mimic empirical
patterns to minimize the effects of this limitation. Next steps would include
gathering data on actual organizational processes. For instance, an empirical study
can examine how an organization makes promotion decisions and evaluate the
presence of biased decision-making.
Second, the present model represents only one particular way that the
mechanisms underlying OGS operate. For example, for the C-suite level in all
simulation runs, true performance of men exceeded that of women. This was due
to the nature of 1) external hires and 2) how perceived performance was sampled.
In a given simulation run, it was possible that 1) a woman was externally hired
and had a sampled ability lower than that of the men present at that level, or that
2) in a given year, a woman’s perceived performance was higher than her true
performance due to variance in sampling which would result in promotion of a
woman with lower true ability. This is only one way in which mechanisms for
how agents are selected or promoted into organizational levels plays out.
However, there could be alternative mechanisms relevant for explaining OGS. For
example, external hiring criteria could be set to better select candidates into all
levels based on more than just sampled ability, or variance in sampling for female
performance can be reduced to model lower risk taking among females compared
to males (Robison-Cox et al., 2007).
Third, to calculate organizational workforce potential, mean performance
of men and women within each organizational level was aggregated to the
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organizational level using the mean (i.e., using an additive model of compilation;
Chan, 1998). This approach typically ignores the variance among the aggregated
means. This approach was acceptable for the purpose of this study based on how
organizational workforce potential was initially defined (i.e., as the sum of
individual performance; Chan, 1998). However, it is possible that workforce
potential is not a direct aggregate of individual performance, and that other
methods, such as using maximal performance at a given level, is more
representative of how a group of individuals is performing altogether to represent
workforce potential.
Fourth, the present study only examined how five factors impact OGS
(i.e., bias in performance evaluation, selection, developmental opportunities,
familial effects, and career decisions). The five factors included in the model
encompass other factors as well (i.e., “developmental opportunities” is designed
to tap into opportunity seeking in terms of negotiations and self-improvement).
However, other variables can impact promotability of individuals, such as risk
taking (Robsion-Cox et al., 2007), number of hours worked (Bertrand, Goldin, &
Katz, 2010), or the influence of workgroup composition (Murphy et al., 2007).
Modeling risk taking among individuals can explore if increased risk taking by
men results in increased upward mobility. For example, the standard deviation of
average male performance can be increased to model this and can show if risk
taking of men increases their likelihood of being promoted. Research shows
reduced hours worked my women accounts partially for disparities in pay
between male and female MBAs (Bertand et al., 2010). The present model does
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not consider how much work an individual is doing, and this factor likely has
implications for performance evaluations. Lastly, research shows belonging to a
numerical minority in a group reduces the likelihood that a minority member will
participate in the group (Murphy et al., 2007). The present study did not consider
how work group participation impacts the other model factors (i.e., developmental
opportunity seeking).
Fifth, the organizational context for this study was a moderately-large
sized firm with cross-industry averages used as a guideline. Research shows
differences in trajectories of men and women by sector (e.g., women are more
represented in retail/restaurants and healthcare compared to industrial
manufacturing and institutional investment; Women in the Workplace, 2017), and
by race (e.g., white women comprise more C-suite positions than both men and
women of color; Women in the Workplace, 2018). The present study did not
consider a broader organizational context that could provide additional
explanation for the emerged results. Consideration of organizational industry can
inform additional parameters necessary for a more accurate depiction of reality.
For example, the type of positions necessary for advancement expands beyond
line and staff positions, especially when considering organizational industry.
Additionally, considering race/ethnicity has implications for the manifestation of
OGS, such as differential progressions into upper leadership for women of color
compared to the progression of white women, men of color, and white men.
Future Research
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The study’s limitations provide numerous avenues for future research.
Future research may additionally expand on the present model by 1) collecting
data on purported mechanisms in the model, 2) assessing alternative mechanisms
than those used in the model, 3) incorporating more model factors, and 4)
expanding on organizational context. To evaluate the mechanisms of this
computational model, empirical data can be collected to validate them. Grand et
al. (2016) took a similar approach in studying team cognition by assessing their
computational predictions using team samples. For the present study, data can be
collected on an individual’s true ability (e.g., intelligence testing) and on
performance perceptions (e.g., performance evaluations), and can be compared to
understand if men are being over-evaluated in their ability compared to women.
This information would confirm or disconfirm the mechanism for comparing true
and perceived organizational performance.
The present model is an examination of the theoretical space that the
proposed factors operate in. Additionally, the current model presents one way in
which various mechanisms operate (e.g., how workforce potential is calculated).
However, as noted in the limitations, these calculations may not be entirely
representative of real-world human processes, such as workforce potential
aggregation. Future research can dig deeper into the aggregation of individual
performance to organizational workforce potential by expanding beyond using an
additive model of compilation (Chan, 1998), and consider how variations in
performance within level impact overall organizational workforce potential. For
example, perceived performance might be stronger at each level based on the
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perceptions of how well a few individuals are performing rather than how an
entire group of employees is performing.
Increasing the number of factors in the model is one way to more closely
resemble reality. One use of computational modeling is to explain processes
underlying individual behaviors (Harrison et al., 2007). Individual behaviors are
not confined to a set of five factors, as demonstrated in this study. Future research
can incorporate factors such as gender/ethnicity (Women in the Workplace,
2018), personality (Barrick & Mount, 1991), and/or motivational orientations
(Payne et al., 2007), for example, to assess how additional individual
characteristics differentially impact OGS manifestation. However, this does
present an additional challenge in isolating the impact of individual effects in an
interdependent model.
Lastly, expanding on organizational context to include organizational
industry and other workgroup demographics is needed to round out the strongest
factors impacting OGS. Future research can build on the current simulation by
including organizational industry, such as healthcare versus finance, to assess the
strongest factors relevant for the respective industries, and to see how the
emergence of OGS changes based on the organizational context. Future research
can also assess how workforce demographics, such as gender and racial
composition of workgroups, impacts individual behaviors (i.e., examining the
numerical minority phenomenon; Murphy et al., 2007).
Conclusion
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This study aimed to understand how five factors (bias in performance
appraisal, bias in selection, differences in developmental opportunities, career
decisions, and familial effects) interactively impact OGS and ultimately impact
organizational workforce potential. Overall, when no bias is present, OGS is
diminished due to equalization of perceived performance and true performance of
men and women. Under low bias, OGS emerges relatively quick (i.e., within 10
years) within each organizational level and becomes stronger with each increasing
organizational level (i.e., OGS is substantially worse in the upper levels of an
organization compared to lower levels). Under high bias, the same patterns
emerge although they appear more rapidly and more severely. In examining
potential HR initiatives, this study points to the criticality of examining bias in
performance appraisal and selection practices. This HR bundle alone diminishes
OGS by way of removing male-favoritism in evaluating performance of
individuals, which allows organizations to promote their best talent regardless of
gender. Focusing on only increasing the number of women in line positions,
providing equal developmental opportunities for men and women, and improving
parental leave policies are not enough to combat OGS based on the model created
for this study. In sum, OGS is a complex process that accumulates over time as a
result of subtle top-down and bottom-up processes. This study offers a
computational model to illuminate and study the complexities involved in the
emergence of OGS.
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Appendix A
Table A1
No Bias Workforce Potential by Level
Condition

Org Level

Gender

True
Performance

Perceived
Performance

Performance
Difference

No Bias

1

Female

127.80

128.81

1.01

No Bias

1

Male

127.80

128.81

1.01

No Bias

2

Female

127.10

128.11

1.01

No Bias

2

Male

127.10

128.11

1.01

No Bias

3

Female

123.73

124.73

1.00

No Bias

3

Male

123.73

124.73

1.00

No Bias

4

Female

117.46

118.46

1.00

No Bias

4

Male

117.46

118.46

1.00

No Bias

5

Female

108.92

109.92

1.00

No Bias

5

Male

108.92

109.92

1.00

No Bias

6

Female

98.46

99.46

1.00

No Bias

6

Male

98.46

99.46

1.00

Table A2
Low Bias Workforce Potential by Level
Condition

Org Level

Gender

True
Performance

Perceived
Performance

Performance
Difference

Low Bias

1

Female

127.62

129.25

1.63

116

Low Bias

1

Male

127.62

129.25

1.63

Low Bias

2

Female

127.00

128.66

1.66

Low Bias

2

Male

127.00

128.66

1.66

Low Bias

3

Female

123.70

125.37

1.67

Low Bias

3

Male

123.70

125.37

1.67

Low Bias

4

Female

117.42

119.09

1.67

Low Bias

4

Male

117.42

119.09

1.67

Low Bias

5

Female

108.87

110.54

1.68

Low Bias

5

Male

108.87

110.54

1.68

Low Bias

6

Female

98.46

100.14

1.68

Low Bias

6

Male

98.46

100.14

1.68

Table A3
High Bias Workforce Potential by Level
Condition

Org Level

Gender

True
Performance

Perceived
Performance

Performance
Difference

High Bias

1

Female

127.29

129.17

1.89

High Bias

1

Male

127.29

129.17

1.89

High Bias

2

Female

127.10

128.76

1.66

High Bias

2

Male

127.10

128.76

1.66

High Bias

3

Female

123.91

125.59

1.69

117

High Bias

3

Male

123.91

125.59

1.69

High Bias

4

Female

117.54

119.24

1.70

High Bias

4

Male

117.54

119.24

1.70

High Bias

5

Female

108.89

110.60

1.70

High Bias

5

Male

108.89

110.60

1.70

High Bias

6

Female

98.43

100.14

1.71

High Bias

6

Male

98.43

100.14

1.71

Table A4
Bundle 1 Workforce Potential by Level
Condition

Org Level

Gender

True
Performance

Perceived
Performance

Performance
Difference

Bundle 1

1

Female

127.85

128.87

1.02

Bundle 1

1

Male

127.85

128.87

1.02

Bundle 1

2

Female

127.05

128.04

0.99

Bundle 1

2

Male

127.05

128.04

0.99

Bundle 1

3

Female

123.70

124.70

1.00

Bundle 1

3

Male

123.70

124.70

1.00

Bundle 1

4

Female

117.42

118.42

1.00

Bundle 1

4

Male

117.42

118.42

1.00

118

Bundle 1

5

Female

108.87

109.87

1.00

Bundle 1

5

Male

108.87

109.87

1.00

Bundle 1

6

Female

98.44

99.44

1.00

Bundle 1

6

Male

98.44

99.44

1.00

Table A5
Bundle 2 Workforce Potential by Level
Condition

Org Level

Gender

True
Performance

Perceived
Performance

Performance
Difference

Bundle 2

1

Female

127.57

129.26

1.69

Bundle 2

1

Male

127.57

129.26

1.69

Bundle 2

2

Female

126.98

128.68

1.70

Bundle 2

2

Male

126.98

128.68

1.70

Bundle 2

3

Female

123.71

125.39

1.68

Bundle 2

3

Male

123.71

125.39

1.68

Bundle 2

4

Female

117.43

119.11

1.68

Bundle 2

4

Male

117.43

119.11

1.68

Bundle 2

5

Female

108.87

110.55

1.68

Bundle 2

5

Male

108.87

110.55

1.68

Bundle 2

6

Female

98.46

100.14

1.68

119

Bundle 2

6

Male

98.46

100.14

1.68

Table A6
Bundle 3 Workforce Potential by Level
Condition

Org Level

Gender

True
Performance

Perceived
Performance

Performance
Difference

Bundle 3

1

Female

127.56

129.20

1.65

Bundle 3

1

Male

127.56

129.20

1.65

Bundle 3

2

Female

127.01

128.68

1.67

Bundle 3

2

Male

127.01

128.68

1.67

Bundle 3

3

Female

123.68

125.36

1.68

Bundle 3

3

Male

123.68

125.36

1.68

Bundle 3

4

Female

117.41

119.08

1.67

Bundle 3

4

Male

117.41

119.08

1.67

Bundle 3

5

Female

108.86

110.54

1.68

Bundle 3

5

Male

108.86

110.54

1.68

Bundle 3

6

Female

98.45

100.13

1.68

Bundle 3

6

Male

98.45

100.13

1.68

